

Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation

VOLUME 1

Introduction—
Global Lessons for Success

VOLUME 1

VOLUME 2

VOLUME 3



Next-Generation Performance- Based Regulation

Volume 1: Introduction— Global Lessons for Success

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
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The Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation Report in Three Volumes

This three-volume report is based on the material found in *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation: Emphasizing Utility Performance to Unleash Power Sector Innovation*,¹ which, like this report, was created for the 21st Century Power Partnership (21CPP). Since 2012, the 21CPP—an initiative of the Clean Energy Ministerial—has been examining critical issues facing the power sector across the globe. Under the direction of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), 21CPP provides thought leadership to identify the best ideas, models, and innovations for the modern power sector that can be implemented by utilities and governments around the world.

An earlier 21CPP report, *Power Systems of the Future*,² published in 2015, summarizes the key forces driving power sector transformation around the world and identifies the viable pathways that have emerged globally for power sector transformation, organized by starting point as illustrated in Figure P-1. In 2016, the 21CPP published an in-depth report describing the Clean Restructuring pathway originally elucidated in *Power Systems of the Future*. A related pathway identified in *Power Systems of the Future* was Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation, and this report builds on that.

Figure P-1. Present status and adjacent pathways to power system transformation



Source: Zinaman, O., Miller, M., Adil A., Arent, D., Cochran, J., Vora, R., Aggarwal, S. et al. 2015. *Power Systems of the Future: A 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership Report*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-6A20-62611. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62611.pdf>.

¹ Littell, D., Kadoch, C., Baker, P., Bhavirkar, R., Dupuy, M., Hausauer, B., Linvill, C., et al. 2017. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation: Emphasizing Utility Performance to Unleash Power Sector Innovation*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. <https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68512.pdf>.

² Zinaman, O., Miller, M., Adil A., Arent, D., Cochran, J., Vora, R., Aggarwal, S. et al. 2015. *Power Systems of the Future: A 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership Report*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-6A20-62611. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62611.pdf>.

With this report, we have divided the full *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation* report into three volumes:

1. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 1: Introduction—Global Lessons for Success
2. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 2: Primer—Essential Elements of Design and Implementation
3. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 3: Innovative Examples from Around the World.

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List of Acronyms

COS	cost of service
DER	distributed energy resource
DSO	distribution system operator
EAM	earnings adjustment mechanism
NREL	National Renewable Energy Laboratory
NY REV	New York's Reforming the Energy Vision
NY-PSC	New York Public Service Commission
PBR	performance-based regulation
PIM	performance incentive mechanism
RIIO	Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs
SAIDI	system average interruption duration index
SAIFI	system average interruption frequency index

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1 Introduction

Performance-based regulation (PBR) enables regulators to reform hundred-year-old regulatory structures to unleash innovations within 21st century power systems. An old regulatory paradigm built to ensure safe and reliable electricity at reasonable prices from capital-intensive electricity monopolies is now adjusting to a new century of disruptive technological advances that change the way utilities make money and what value customers expect from their own electricity company.

Advanced technologies are driving change in power sectors around the globe. Innovative technologies are transforming the way electricity is generated, delivered, and consumed. These emerging technology drivers include renewable generation; distributed energy resources (DERs), such as distributed generation and energy storage; demand-side management measures, such as demand response, electric vehicles, and smart grid technologies; and energy efficiency.

Today, average residential customers are increasingly able to control their energy usage and even become grid resources, something not contemplated in the 20th century era of large centrally operated generating plants. There are now new energy capabilities throughout the power sector. Traditional centralized power generation and transmission are being supplemented with customer-sited generation, energy management and energy efficiency solutions, and energy storage.

The ongoing transformation to a more efficient and more complex grid means utility business models are also changing. Utilities in many advanced economies that historically have grown by building new power plants and large transmission lines are now adjusting to lower—or even flat—growth in electricity usage.³ Some utility business models are being challenged as they face less demand for electricity sales, and all are facing increasing demands for new services and uses of their system. With this transformation, utilities

worldwide are increasingly finding themselves delivering value to customers who have different needs, who want to use electricity in different ways, and who sometimes offer value back to the utilities. PBR enables regulators to recognize the value that electric utilities bring to customers by enabling these advanced technologies and integrating smart solutions into the utility grid and utility operations.

All regulation is incentive regulation.⁴ Regulated entities respond to the incentives they are provided. Traditional cost of service (COS) regulation looked at performance in terms of sales, revenue, and rate (price) and often service reliability, safety, and quality. Regulated entities responded to the incentives inherent in traditional COS regulation and provided service according to the performance requirements implicit in traditional utility regulation. Changes in the electric energy system and in customer preferences mean there is an increasing interest in motivating regulated entities in areas beyond traditional COS performance. Modifications to the COS model, called PBRs, are not new. Multi-year rate plans, a first effort at PBRs, were first used in the 1980s for railroads, telecommunications, and other industries facing competition and changing demand, and they were introduced for U.S. electric utilities in the 1990s.

A PBR represents a significant modification to historical COS utility regulation paradigms, wherein performance incentives can operate as an incremental add-on to traditional regulation or state-owned models to influence management to align utility planning, investments, and operations with societal goals. This report defines PBRs and performance incentive mechanisms (PIMs) as:

- PBRs provide a regulatory framework to connect goals, targets, and measures to utility performance or executive compensation. For some enterprises, PBRs determine utility revenue or shareholder earnings based on specific performance metrics and other non-investment factors.

³ However, in many advancing economies, such as Mexico, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, and Brazil, demand for electricity continues to grow between 3% and 10% annually.

⁴ Bradford, P. 1989. *Incentive Regulation from a State Commission Perspective. Remarks to the Chief Executive's Forum.*

Non-investment factors can be particularly important for state-owned entities, such as by providing low-cost service and being responsive to government mandates. For utilities of all types, PBRs can strengthen the incentives of utilities to perform in desired ways.

- *PIMs* are components of PBRs that adopt specific performance metrics, targets, or incentives to affect desired utility performance and represent the priorities of the jurisdiction. PIMs can be specific performance metrics, targets, or incentives that lead to an increment or decrement of revenues or earnings around an authorized rate of return to strengthen performance in target areas. PIMs can act as an overlay on a traditional COS regulatory framework for privately owned utilities in which a return on rate base is computed in a rate case. For state-owned entities and investor-owned utilities, a PIM can take on the form of manager performance reviews (on specific criteria) that are linked to manager income or promotion.

Well-designed PBRs provide incentives for utility performance, thus benefiting consumers and utility owners alike. This report considers the role of both PBRs and more discrete PIMs in 21st century power sector transformation. Innovative technologies are transforming the way electricity is generated, delivered, and consumed. PBRs have the potential to realign utility, investor, and consumer incentives and mitigate emerging challenges to the utility business model, renewable integration, and even cyber security.

The goals of PBRs in the form of multi-year rate plans are in many respects the same in terms of providing reasonably priced and reliable service to customers. However, today's technologies have changed, and there is more emphasis on clean energy. Thus, the pathways and the potential outcomes are different than they were in the 20th century when centralized generator stations and large infrastructure additions dominated the utility landscape.

The changing power sector—including penetration of new disruptive technologies such as decentralization of supply, growth of demand-side resources, and increasing intelligence and digitalization of networks—will also change what regulation looks like in an era of disruptive

technologies. Given unprecedented changes underway in the electricity sector, PBRs—by specifying expectations of utility performance and outcomes for consumers, while staying agnostic to the exact means of delivery—constitute a form of prescient regulation that harnesses disruption. PBRs are one tool in the toolbox in the transition toward flexible regulatory and market structures that rewards utilities that adapt or evolve in reaction to market and technology change.

PBRs that succeed often do so because they rely on clear goal setting, use a simple design, make clear the value of the utility service, and are transparent at each step. Alignment of incentives and benefits for customers and ratepayers tends to make the relationship of the cost of incentives and value of performance easier to understand. Metrics that are clearly identified with objective information support ease of implementation, accountability, and the transparency of the value proposition to regulators, utility management, customers, policymakers, and the public.

Depending on the PBR goals and needs of each jurisdiction, there are several proven PBR and PIM design options, including shared net benefits, program cost adders, target bonuses, base return on equity incentive payments, bonus returns on equity for capital, incentives for kilowatt-hour targets, peak reduction, and penetration measures for DERs.

Electricity has historically been a commodity product delivered by a monopoly service provider. Increasingly, electricity is also an enhanced value service. PBRs enable regulators to compensate utilities for the value that utilities capture for the grid, customers, and society. Although some analysts believe PBRs are only applicable to developed economies, we take a different view and hold mainly that well-designed PBRs are a valuable tool to be applied in a variety of economic and technological situations worldwide. PBRs require capable regulators but not necessarily mature economies.

PBRs and PIMs have great value for the electric industry when designed well, and they can be applied to many different situations. How exactly PBR mechanisms are

most effectively enacted will vary based on the utility ownership model, institutional arrangements, and various local factors. PBRs should be tailored to the needs and goals of each jurisdiction, and perhaps each utility, to most effectively achieve the needs of a 21st century power grid in that jurisdiction. PBRs have a growing history. This report highlights the lessons learned from this history and identifies considerations for how PBRs may be best applied. PBRs will continue to evolve and the lessons learned from new applications will continue to accrue.

Electric utilities are embedded in an increasingly sophisticated technological society. The power sector often represents progress in developing countries. In all jurisdictions, utilities enable achievement of important societal goals. Performance-based regulation is regulation in which anyone can know how good utilities are at delivering on clearly stated expectations and, in its higher form, where management is strongly motivated to deliver on public goals as well as internal and fiduciary goals.

In this volume, we examine some leading examples of PBRs:

- The United Kingdom's Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs (RIIO) initiatives, which focus on outcomes and customer satisfaction
- New York's Reforming the Energy Vision (NY REV) initiative, which seeks to better integrate and harness markets for distributed resources with utility operations and create a new paradigm for utility coordination of distribution-level investments with distributed resources
- Denmark's success with benchmarking PBRs to improve distribution system reliability
- Mexico's PBR program to reduce distribution and transmission system losses
- South Africa's benchmarking PBR to set a cost of coal.

We also look at what we have learned from experience with multi-year rate plans and early forms of PBRs, particularly for energy efficiency, including that:

- Predictability and incrementalism matter for utilities to succeed with PBRs.

- Implementing PBRs without financial incentives builds experience.
- Focusing on metrics with clear measurement methods is valuable and more likely to result in success.
- PBR incentives should be sized in alignment with desired results.
- An appropriate range for PBR impact can be based on traditional COS financial limits.

Lessons in setting PBRs on what *not* to do include:

- Basing performance incentives on inputs is generally a poor practice. Inputs, and particularly spending, tell little about whether a successful outcome or savings are achieved.
- The "business-as-usual" outcomes need to be understood before incentive levels and targets are set. If incentive levels or targets are set at what business-as-usual operations would achieve anyway, additional incentive costs are incurred with no additional benefit to customers.
- Regulators learn that sometimes rewards or penalties are set too high or too low to reach the desired outcomes. Experience allows for modifications and adjustments to refine PBR programs.
- Establishing a well-designed set of performance incentives can require significant utility and regulatory resources.
- Unclear or uncertain metrics or goals create uncertainty for the utility and regulator.

Utilities and utility regulators across the world are experimenting with different business models and regulatory methods to address the technological, business, and economic challenges and opportunities that the 21st century has brought to the power sector. As context for a discussion around next-generation practices, this document and continuing documents in the series will offer some examples of what is working and why and what might work better in the world of power utility PBRs.

2 Examples of Well-Functioning PBRs

The following are examples of PBR mechanisms worldwide that have been successful at achieving their objectives. This is not an exhaustive list of successful PBR mechanisms, but rather those that are known to the authors. It is also important to note that the context and jurisdiction are important: what is successful in one jurisdiction with one set of objectives and constraints may not succeed in another jurisdiction. As a result, a wide variety of PBR applications is evident in diverse jurisdictions. The examples of PBR in this report vary from, for example, energy efficiency, system reliability, transmission system efficiency, and cost of coal management to entire power sector transformation. They highlight lessons learned about what worked in some jurisdictions to achieve PBR goals and may offer lessons for other jurisdictions.

2.1.1 The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's RIIO offers a point of departure to articulate the characteristics of next-generation performance-based regulation. The main goal of RIIO is the "timely delivery of a sustainable energy sector at a lower cost to consumers than would be the case under the existing regimes."⁵ RIIO is a framework that retains strong cost control incentives while attempting to focus on long-term performance, outputs, and outcomes, with less focus on *ex post* review of investment costs.

A review of the previous RPI-X⁶ price and revenue control mechanism, instituted in the 1990s, concluded that, although there was a need for large-scale investment in low-carbon energy infrastructure and more effective engagement with customers, U.K. utilities were risk-averse, too slow to innovate, and focused on appeasing regulators rather than satisfying customers.⁷ There were also concerns that the previous regulatory framework encouraged a focus on capital costs containment rather than outputs, and the RPI-X framework had been modified and had become rather complex.⁸ RIIO, emplaced in 2013, was intended to begin a transition away from the traditional approach of simply rewarding investment in networks (sometimes called the "predict and provide mentality") under the prior regime to an outcome-based approach—a shift from inputs to outputs through revenue-based regulation overlaid with a system of financial rewards for achievement of specified goals (performance).⁹

U.K. regulators changed their price and revenue control mechanism to remove any bias that may normally exist between capital expenditures and operational expenses that would tend to lead utilities to prefer capital expenditures. This approach, which has been referred to as TOTEX (i.e., total expenditures),¹⁰ means there is an incentive to deliver outputs rather than simply build new infrastructure. There was also an associated move from

⁵ Ofgem. 2010. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks. <https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/64031/re-wiringbritainfs.pdf>.

⁶ The RPI-X framework had been in place since 1991, following privatization of the energy industry. Mandel, B. 2015. "The Merits of an 'Integrated' Approach to Performance-Based Regulation." *Electricity Journal* 28(4): 4–17.

⁷ Mandel, B. 2014. *A Primer on Utility Regulation in the United Kingdom: Origins, Aims, and Mechanics of the RIIO Model*. <http://guaranicenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/RIIO-Issue-Brief.pdf>

⁸ Jenkins, C. 2011 (June). *Examining the Economics Underlying Ofgem's New Regulatory Framework*. Florence School of Regulation Working Paper. http://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/80939/Jenkins_RIIO-Economics_draft-paper-FINAL.pdf.

⁹ By "revenue-based," we mean a method by which "target" or "allowed" revenue levels are determined by regulators and collected by means of adjustments to prices as sales vary (as they inevitably do) from expected levels. (This is what is known as decoupling in the United States.) The allowed revenues themselves may be periodically adjusted to deal with non-sales-related cost drivers, such as inflation, productivity improvements, and approved changes in investment. Such changes are often formulaic in nature and embedded in multi-year regulatory plans.

¹⁰ The move to a total expenditure, or TOTEX, regime was first suggested by Ofgem in March 2008, when the energy regulator launched its RPI-X@20 review. From this comprehensive review of the previous regulatory regime, which had endured since privatization in 1989, emerged the RIIO model.

the previous five-year price control term to eight years as a reflection of the long-term nature of the investments necessary for a low-carbon transition. Output areas that emerged from a public process intended to distill regulatory priorities include:

1. Customer satisfaction
2. Network safety
3. Network reliability
4. New connection

5. Environmental impact
6. Social obligations.

RIIO separates goals into one-year and eight-year outputs. For each price-revenue control regime (gas, electricity distribution, electricity transmission), the regulatory authority Ofgem defines deliverables (measures of success) and units for measurement where applicable (metrics). Using the example of the price-revenue control regime for gas transmission and distribution (known as RIIO-GD1), Figure 1 shows the deliverables, incentives, and metrics for those




Figure 1. RIIO outputs

Ofgem. 2016. RIIO-ED1 Annual Report 2015–16. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2017/02/riio-ed1_annual_report_2015-16_supplement.pdf.

price control regimes where applicable. Note that not all outputs are associated with incentives; this is to avoid unintended consequences (e.g., misreporting incidents), and because some outputs are governed by other government agencies and are thus outside the control of the utility.

RIIO has a notable innovation: utility benchmarking and scorecards identify utilities that excel or lag. Ofgem publishes annual reports on the performance of all network companies, including tables that compare performance output areas. Figure 1 is based on one of the tables provided. Color coding indicates the level of success achieved in the last year or forecast to be achieved over the eight-year period. The more innovative elements of RIIO are addressed in Volume 3.

2.1.2 United States

PBR programs in the United States have successfully addressed cost management, customer service, energy efficiency, and reliability.

2.1.2.1 California

California's experience with PBR has produced some successes as well as some notable failures. Perhaps the most successful performance-based program in California is a gas utility mechanism that allows gas utilities to retain part of the proceeds from effectively managing gas supply costs on behalf of ratepayers. Gas utilities in California have a proven record of effectively purchasing and hedging gas supply. The PBR mechanism deserves credit for this success, as the program consistently produces savings for ratepayers and revenue for gas utility shareholders.

A second performance-based program that may have produced a beneficial outcome is the cost recovery mechanism established for the Diablo Canyon nuclear power

plant. Cost overruns and project delays led to significant consumer discontent with the costs of Diablo Canyon. As a result, a standard rate base-focused cost recovery mechanism was rejected in favor of a performance-based mechanism that made investor-owned utility Pacific Gas and Electric's revenue recovery contingent on the availability of the units. Diablo Canyon enjoyed a very high availability rate and operated with a very high capacity factor for much of its service life. One can reasonably infer that the performance-based mechanism was at least partly responsible for this positive track record.¹¹ The mechanism is not without its critics, however. Some consumer advocates felt the mechanism was too generous, and Pacific Gas and Electric was not really held accountable for its relatively poor management of the construction of the facility.¹² Pacific Gas and Electric avoided billions of dollars of potential disallowed costs by accepting the mechanism, but it also was held accountable for its performance. Valid points are expressed on opposite sides of this debate and resolving them here is beyond the scope of this brief report. However, it is worth noting that this experience with "performance ratemaking" created some negative feelings toward PBR by consumer advocates that affected their receptivity to the PBR proposals that followed.

2.1.2.2 New York's Reforming the Energy Vision

The State of New York has undertaken an ambitious effort to transform its regulatory system. New York's effort aims to construct a regulatory system that rewards distribution utilities for high levels of customer satisfaction, facilitates power sector transformation to cleaner and more distributed resources, and increasingly focuses on outcomes rather than inputs (which is similar to the U.K.'s RIIO approach). This comprehensive effort, still in its infancy in terms of implementation, is referred to as Reforming the Energy Vision (NY REV) and is led by the New York Public Service Commission (NY-PSC).

¹¹ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, pp. 63-64.

¹² Ibid.




Figure 2. Sources of utility revenue within NY REV¹⁵

2016

To incubate power sector transformation, NY REV is using a form of PBR that provides for several outcome-based incentives to be implemented, called earnings adjustment mechanisms (EAMs).¹³ The purpose of EAMs is to “encourage achievement of new policy objectives and counter the implicit negative incentives that the current ratemaking model provides against REV objectives.” They are intended to play a bridge role until other forms of market-based revenues are available at scale to become a meaningful contributor to distribution utilities’ revenue requirements. The NY-PSC believes the need for EAMs will diminish over time, as utilities’ opportunities to earn from platform service revenues increase.¹⁴ However, the NY-PSC does not intend to place a time limit of the intended bridge role on any particular EAM, and it expects that

some EAMs will supplement the contributions of platform service revenues for the foreseeable future. Figure 2 illustrates this bridge for utility revenues as envisioned. The specific portfolio of EAMs offered to utilities by the regulator may also change over time to reflect advancing technologies with new and different capacities, such as energy storage installed at a distribution substation or at consumer premises, which would offer complementary but different capacity to grid operators and consumers. Because of the unique situation of each distribution utility, the financial details of the EAMs are developed in rate proceedings.

Like RIIO, the NY REV process focuses on outcomes, because the NY-PSC believes this focus will be the “most effective approach to address the mismatch between

¹³ NY-PSC. 2016 (May 19). Case No. 14-M-0101. *Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework*.

¹⁴ Platform service revenues are new forms of revenues utilities will earn from displacing traditional infrastructure projects with non-wires alternatives. They include (1) services that the NY-PSC will require the utility to provide as part of market development, (2) voluntary value-added services that are provided through the distribution system provider function that have an operational nexus with core utility offerings, and (3) competitive new services that can be readily performed by third parties, including non-regulated utility affiliates, and should not be offered by regulated utilities.

¹⁵ Mitchell, C. 2016. “U.S. Regulatory Reform: NY Utility Transformation.” *U.S. Regulatory Reform Series*. <http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/us-regulatory-reform-ny-utility-transformation/>.

traditional revenue methods and modern electric system needs.”¹⁶ The NY-PSC supports an outcome-based model for the following reasons:

1. NY REV seeks to integrate the activities of markets, including customers and third-party DER developers. Although utilities do not have control over customer or third-party actions, this approach recognizes that their activities in the aggregate, along with utilities’ activities, are critical to the optimal performance of the new system. This opens the door to including metrics to encourage utilities to motivate third-party activity

where doing so provides efficient system outcomes. For example, metrics could reflect third-party market activity for DER providers. Utilities also could solve distribution-level issues uncovered by their operation of the distribution system platform if a metric were established to measure private DER activity.

2. Outcome-based incentives encourage innovation by utilities, allowing utilities to determine the most effective strategy to achieve policy objectives, including cooperation with third parties and development of new business concepts that would not be considered under narrow program-based incentives.




Figure 3. Different state approaches to energy efficiency

The figure also illustrates states that have adopted revenue decoupling and lost-revenue adjust mechanisms (LRAMs), which allow utilities to recover for revenue lost if utility sales decrease because of energy efficiency program savings. Revenue decoupling and LRAMs are well established to ensure adequate utility revenue recovery and are sometimes associated with PBRs, even though they operate differently to adjust utility revenue. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE 2015, April). Quadrennial Energy Review: Energy Transmission, Storage, and Distribution Infrastructure. https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/04/f22/QR-ALL%20FINAL_0.pdf.

¹⁶ The early New York experience with one utility is that in order to ensure the EAMs are outcome-oriented, there should be a strong stakeholder group and process to help define the metric outputs (the individual measurable activities undertaken by the utility, such as “X number of calls answered in less than 20 seconds”). If a stakeholder group does not exist, the utility may be more likely to propose metrics based on program targets rather than on outcomes. This tendency may change over time as experience with New York’s EAMs grows and also as a function of strong utility leadership.

3. Outcome-based incentives encourage an enterprise-wide approach to achieving results; they are appropriate where there are many program inputs to the system. Good outcomes are created by a range of utility activities that are planned to jointly and perhaps synergistically modify program inputs to influence the outcome along with private market activities of customers and third parties.
4. Regulation should seek outcomes that simulate competitive market behavior where possible and beneficial.
5. Having utility earnings affected by market outcomes over which they have limited influence is not a new principle. For example, under traditional ratemaking before decoupling, utilities had a general incentive to promote growth in sales, whereas many other market and customer factors also influenced this outcome.

Such an “outcome orientation” can also better align utility activity and performance with public policy and societal objectives of the regulators and jurisdiction authorities. The more innovative elements of NY REV are addressed in Volume 3 of this report.

2.1.2.3 U.S. Jurisdictions with Energy Efficiency PBRs

Numerous U.S. jurisdictions have used PBR to motivate adoption of energy efficiency goals and satisfaction of targets and metrics (Figure 3). For example, at least 26 U.S. states have used performance incentives to encourage energy efficiency deployments. These incentives include allowing a utility to earn (1) a percentage of program costs for achieving a savings target (eight states), (2) a share of achieved savings (13 states), (3) a share of the net-present-value of avoided costs (four states), and (4) an altered rate of return for achieving savings targets (one state). Over time, energy efficiency program performance improved markedly in states offering these incentives.¹⁷

2.1.3 Denmark

Denmark has used PBR to improve system reliability by imposing metrics on the Danish distribution system operators (DSOs). The DSOs are subject to an “outage” or quality of supply benchmarking model, which is applied annually. The goals of the quality of supply benchmarking model are to disincentivize utility outages and to improve network reliability, as measured by the system average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) and the system average interruption duration index (SAIDI). SAIFI and SAIDI are internationally recognized metrics commonly defined (even as precise definitions vary) and easily measured.

Danish DSOs are penalized if they have a higher weighted SAIDI or SAIFI than a benchmark set by higher-performing DSOs. The “outage” methodology applies to DSOs rather than the transmission system operator. The transmission system operator reports SAIDI and SAIFI but is not included in the DSO PBR scheme. This Danish application of reliability metrics illustrates how PBR can improve system reliability through some versions of SAIFI and SAIDI, and other common reliability metrics. As illustrated in Figure 4 (next page), reliability PBR schemes often rely on negative incentives.¹⁸

2.1.4 Mexico

Mexico has implemented PBR for its transmission and distribution system. It also has developed some metrics for distributed generation and interconnection that could form the basis of a PBR mechanism. Since the beginning of the energy reform in Mexico in 2015, the Energy Regulatory Commission has put in place performance-based compensation. Performance-based compensation is offered for minimizing transmission system losses and system losses. The transmission system has a performance-based compensation system for reducing line losses, but the targeted quantity of line loss reductions is quite small.

¹⁷ State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network. 2016. *SEE Action Guide for States: Energy Efficiency as a Least Cost Strategy to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution and Meet Energy Needs in the Power Sector*. Prepared by Schwartz, L., Leventis, G., Schiller, S., and Fadrhanc, E. of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, with assistance by Shenot, J., Colburn, K., and James, C. of The Regulatory Assistance Project and Zetterberg, J. and Roy, M. of the U.S. Department of Energy. <https://www4.eere.energy.gov/seeaction/system/files/documents/pathways-guide-states-final0415.pdf>, pp. 12–13 citing numerous sources.

¹⁸ NordReg. 2011. *Economic Regulation of Electricity Grids in Nordic Countries*. http://www.nordicenergyregulators.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Economic_regulation_of_electricity_grids_in_Nordic_countries.pdf.

In contrast, technical and non-technical line losses in the distribution system tend to be quite high in Mexico, so the targeted distribution line loss reductions are far higher. Each of the Comisión Federal de Electricidad's 16 distribution service areas has its own distribution system loss reduction targets. The loss reduction schedules are linear three-year pathways toward a third-year ultimate target. CFE Distribution Company has the targeted amounts of losses incorporated within its revenue requirement. If the losses exceed the target, CFE Distribution Company pays. If the losses are less than the target, CFE Distribution Company keeps the money.


The new regulatory framework for distributed generation includes very specific performance requirements for the application and interconnection process, but there is no penalty or compensation mechanism associated

with these requirements so far. For example, there is a schedule for interconnection with well-defined steps and associated mandatory timelines for distributed generation interconnection, as depicted in Table 1 (next page).

In addition, the regulation established a timeframe of 365 days for the distribution utility to develop a web-based platform for the management of the interconnection process, making it possible to make an interconnection request via the web. The same platform must be able to show statistics about the integration of distributed generation, including the hosting capacity of distribution circuits and the actual amount of installed capacity. Once available, the platform must be updated every three months.¹⁹ With time, these performance requirements could support a traditional discretionary penalty structure or a PBR construct in Mexico on interconnection.

Illustrative Example of Danish Quality of Supply Benchmark

The example includes five DSOs: A, B, C, D and E. Company A has the lowest weighted SAIFI while Company B has the second lowest and so forth. Together, Company A, Company B, Company C, and Company D have precisely 80 percent of the aggregate transmission network.



Company D has a weighted SAIFI of 0.09. Thus, companies that have a weighted SAIFI higher than 0.09 are penalized with an up to one-percent reduction in their allowed operational costs. In this example, Company E is penalized.

Source: DERA, 2009.

Figure 4. Identification of regional Danish DSOs with poor quality of supply

¹⁹ SEGOB. 2017. Section 3.1, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5474790&fecha=07/03/2017.

2.1.5 South Africa

Basic system efficiency is pursued by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa to ensure the cost of coal is managed by its utilities to benchmark standards. The National Energy Regulator of South Africa has adopted a

PBR formula to assess the utilities' cost of coal management by comparing actual costs of coal to a benchmark for costs using a PBR formula.²⁰ Other performance expectations are related to pricing, such as maintaining adequate coal reserves for various contingencies including labor strikes that are unique to the South African context.

Table 1. Mandated Timeframe for Distributed Generation Interconnection Application Processing²¹

Activity	Responsible Entity	Maximum Working Days for Response
Registry of the request	Retail provider	1
Verification of information	Distribution utility	2
Letter of acceptance when no study or infrastructure is required	Distribution utility	4
Letter with study or infrastructure budget	Distribution utility	10
Documentation review	Retail provider	1
Modification of the interconnection infrastructure	Applicant or distribution utility	TBD*
Relocation of meter	Distribution utility	5
Assignment of agreement	Retailer	2
Integration to the commercial scheme	Retailer	1
Total time without study or infrastructure modification	13	
Total time with study or infrastructure modification*	18	

* These times do not include the construction of specific upgrades or the response times of the activities that correspond to the Applicant. In Mexico, either the applicant or the distribution utility can make the required grid upgrades.

²⁰ The allowed coal cost for regulatory control account purposes will be determined by comparing the coal benchmark costs with Eskom's actual costs of coal (R/ton cost) using a PBR formula per contract type. The allowed actual total cost is calculated by applying the following formula on a contract type basis:

$$\text{Allowed actual cost (Rand)} = [\text{Alpha} \times \text{Actual Unit Cost of Coal Burn} + (1 - \text{Alpha}) \times \text{Benchmark Unit Cost of Coal Burn}] \times \text{Actual Coal Burn Volume}$$

where: *Actual Unit Cost* = Actual unit cost of coal burn in a financial year (R/ton), *Benchmark Cost* = Allowed coal burn unit cost for the contract type for the year considered (R/ton), *Actual Coal Burn Volume* = Actual tonnage of coal burn in the financial year considered, *Alpha* = the factor that determines the ratio in which risks in coal burn expenditure are divided, that is, those that are passed through to the customers, and those that must be carried by Eskom; any number of the alpha between 0 and 1, set to share the risk of the coal cost variance between licensees and its customers. (National Energy Regulator of South Africa, Annexure 1, Multi-Year Price Determination (MYPD) Methodology, 17.2.8, pp. 34-35.)

²¹ SEGOB. 2016. Section 5.2, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5465576&fecha=15/12/2016.

3 Conclusion

This introduction to PBRs employed successfully world-wide is meant to encourage readers to explore the next two volumes in this report on essential design elements for PBRs (Volume 2) and innovative examples of PBRs (Volume 3). Well-designed PBRs provide both incentives for utility performance and benefits for consumers and utility owners. PBRs and more discrete PIMs will be important tools in 21st century power sector transformation. PBRs have the potential to realign utility, investor, and consumer incentives; mitigate emerging challenges to the utility business model; alleviate the challenges of and accelerate renewable integration; and even address cyber security concerns.



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Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation

VOLUME 2

Primer—Essential Elements
of Design and Implementation

VOLUME 1

VOLUME 2

VOLUME 3

Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation

Volume 2: Primer—Essential Elements of Design and Implementation

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
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The Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation Report in Three Volumes

This three-volume report is based on the material found in *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation: Emphasizing Utility Performance to Unleash Power Sector Innovation*,¹ which, like this report, was created for the 21st Century Power Partnership (21CPP). Since 2012, the 21CPP—an initiative of the Clean Energy Ministerial—has been examining critical issues facing the power sector across the globe. Under the direction of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), 21CPP provides thought leadership to identify the best ideas, models, and innovations for the modern power sector that can be implemented by utilities and governments around the world.

An earlier 21CPP report, *Power Systems of the Future*,² published in 2015, summarizes the key forces driving power sector transformation around the world and identifies the viable pathways that have emerged globally for power sector transformation, organized by starting point as illustrated in Figure P-1. In 2016, the 21CPP published an in-depth report describing the Clean Restructuring pathway originally elucidated in *Power Systems of the Future*. A related pathway identified in *Power Systems of the Future* was Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation, and this report builds on that.

Figure P-1. Present status and adjacent pathways to power system transformation



Source: Zinaman, O., Miller, M., Adil A., Arent, D., Cochran, J., Vora, R., Aggarwal, S. et al. 2015. *Power Systems of the Future: A 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership Report*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-6A20-62611. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62611.pdf>.

¹ Littell, D., Kadoch, C., Baker, P., Bharvirkar, R., Dupuy, M., Hausauer, B., Linvill, C., et al. 2017. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation: Emphasizing Utility Performance to Unleash Power Sector Innovation*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. <https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68512.pdf>.

² Zinaman, O., Miller, M., Adil A., Arent, D., Cochran, J., Vora, R., Aggarwal, S. et al. 2015. *Power Systems of the Future: A 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership Report*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-6A20-62611. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62611.pdf>.

With this report, we have divided the full *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation* report into three volumes:

1. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 1: Introduction—Global Lessons for Success
2. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 2: Primer—Essential Elements of Design and Implementation
3. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 3: Innovative Examples from Around the World.

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List of Acronyms

21CPP	Century Power Partnership
DEA	data envelopment analysis
DER	distributed energy resource
DISCOM	distribution company
DSM	demand-side management
EAM	earnings adjustment mechanism
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
gridcos	grid companies
kWh	kilowatt-hour
MW	megawatt
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission (China)
NREL	National Renewable Energy Laboratory
NY REV	New York's Reforming the Energy Vision
NY-PSC	New York Public Service Commission
PBR	performance-based regulation
PIM	performance incentive mechanism
ROE	return on equity
RIIO	Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs
T&D	transmission and distribution
UDAY	Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana

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1 Introduction

Volume 1 of this report, *Introduction—Global Lessons for Success*, defined performance-based regulations (PBRs) for the 21st century and provided examples of successful mechanisms from around the world. This volume, Volume 2, focuses on the importance of understanding institutional arrangements, the best practices for design, development, and implementation of PBR mechanisms. Section 2 discusses the importance of understanding the incentives inherent in institutional arrangements, especially utility composition and ownership structure. We start with this discussion because an understanding of the institutional arrangements and the corresponding incentives or disincentives that have evolved over time is critical to being able to successfully build a PBR that can influence institutional behavior to achieve different outcomes. One factor that is important in this analysis is determining the utility type, by which we mean whether the utility provides generation, transmission, and distribution services as well as natural gas and water service or any combination of these. This will affect how it responds to incentives. The ownership structure of the utility is also important because it determines the type of incentive structure that will have traction on the specific utility.

Once the institutional arrangements and inherent incentives are clearly understood, we can build on this understanding with some best practices for PBRs. Section 3 offers best practices for the development and design of successful PBR mechanisms. It focuses on the design process itself and principles for the approach of specific elements of the mechanism. This section is intended to provide guidance to decision makers as they craft PBR mechanisms for their jurisdictions. There is no “cookbook” to create a PBR mechanism because specific jurisdictional considerations require modification and thought. Section 3 details nine best practices that are important to successful PBR mechanisms.

Section 4 lists various PBR design elements that could be incorporated into specific jurisdictions. Not all these elements will be used in every mechanism, but some of the design elements will be useful for readers to consider during the design process.

2 Institutional Arrangements, Utility Composition, and Ownership Structure Matters

This section offers considerations for assessing existing system incentives and drivers, which are critical to understand before determining the appropriate PBR mechanism.

- **Key Point 1:** It is critical to understand the institutional arrangements within a jurisdiction, which have incentives inherent in the structure.
- **Key Point 2:** Consideration of the utility composition is critical to understand both the concerns the utility is facing with respect to technological change and how the utility will respond to incentives.
- **Key Point 3:** The ownership structure determines the types of incentives structure that will have traction on a specific utility.

Regulatory structures are embedded within the institutional arrangements that are unique to the history, context, and legal structures of each jurisdiction. It is important to examine these structures and evaluate the incentives that are inherent in it. An understanding of the institutional arrangements and the corresponding incentives or disincentives that have evolved over time is critical to successfully building a PBR that can influence institutional behavior to achieve different outcomes. Text Box 1 illustrates how transformative change in technologies tends to increase consumer control.

PBR design, as with all regulation, must be thought out in detail to ensure the explicit and implicit incentives are the desired ones. To do this, regulators must understand incentives at work in a particular context. Understanding the ownership of the regulated entity, the financial and management structure, and how it maximizes its revenue and profit, is critical. Transmission-only utilities will have different drivers than distribution-only utilities.

State-owned entities will respond to different incentives than will investor-owned, vertically integrated utilities. That said, some utility elements are universal. Utility managers respond to institutional incentives and opportunities for recognition, advancement, and compensation in similar ways, regardless of the ownership structure. This section focuses on how regulators and stakeholders might most effectively set PBR for distinct utility forms, including regions with investor-owned utilities, government-owned utilities, and other contexts.

2.1 The Utility Type

The composition of the utility, by which we mean whether the utility provides generation, transmission, and distribution services as well as natural gas and even water service, or any combination of these, will affect how it responds to incentives. A brief explanation of utility constructs is warranted.

1. Vertically integrated utilities are responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution of power to retail customers. In many cases, they own all or some of the power generation plants and transmission lines, but they may also buy power through contracts from merchant generators.
2. Distribution-only utilities build, operate, and maintain the distribution wires connecting the transmission grid to the final customer. The “wires” and “customer service” functions provided by a distribution utility can be separated (but seldom are) so that two separate entities are used to supply these two types of distribution services.
3. Generation companies are regulated or non-regulated entities (depending on the utility industry structure) that operate and maintain existing generating plants. The generation company may own the generation plants or interact with the short-term power generation market on behalf of plant owners.

4. Transmission companies build, maintain, and either own or operate transmission lines.

Each utility type is also experiencing a wave of technological change and will have different concerns about these changes. Generation companies desire to have their generating plants called on by the system operators, and they do not want their plants to become stranded assets

or seldom called on as less-expensive forms of generation (either utility owned or distributed) become available. Transmission companies want to ensure their existing wires are used in the most advantageous way, which may be problematic as many of the best renewable generation sites are not located along major transmission routes. Distribution companies want to sell power to customers, and they are concerned that increasing penetration of

Text Box 1. Transformative Technologies from the Past Increase Customer Control

Recent history is full of other transformative technology changes that were not foreseen by experts. These technologies often were initially opposed by the industry but ultimately led to altered business models and more consumer control and choice—a pattern that is unfolding similarly today in the power sector.

For example, as mass-market VCRs took off in the 1970s, they started to disrupt the television industry's business model. The TV industry initially did not see the potential in having TV content outside their network schedules and opposed the new technologies. Meanwhile, consumers viewed VCRs and VHS cassettes as the means to take control of their television and movie viewing through recording television programs for viewing at another time, and later through movie rentals. As VHS cassette use expanded and then gave way to DVDs in the late 1990s and 2000s, video rental stores prospered, and consumers bought new, lower-cost technologies that improved their home video experience. This increased their options and control of what to watch and when. More recently, those choices have expanded even more with video on demand (VOD) services, including pay-per-view video, video downloads, and streaming media. In early 2016, about half of Americans subscribed to VOD services like Netflix and Amazon Prime in their homes. Meanwhile, analysts say movie theater attendance and TV viewing are declining yearly, especially among younger consumers, whereas viewing media on tablets and smartphones is increasing. Today, customers enjoy a great availability of content across platforms, giving them significantly more power to control how, what, where, and when to view media. Business models

of several industries have been born, died, or evolved to accommodate such changing technology and increasing consumer control.

A similar evolution resulted in the move from phone landlines to cell phones to smartphones. In 2007, more than three-quarters of U.S. households had a landline in their home, compared to an estimated 47% in the first half of 2016.^a Meanwhile, households using only cell phones grew from less than 20% to an estimated 49% during the same period.^b These changes have had wide-ranging and well-documented impacts on the telecommunications industry, which initially tried to fight the use of mobile phones, saying they were uneconomic and unreliable. As costs declined and reliability improved when the networks were built out, consumers trended away from relying on landlines, preferring the increased control of being able to make calls from almost anywhere. The emergence of smartphones opened up options, opportunities, and control for consumers, who now can make calls, text and email, maintain calendars, watch media, play video games, navigate by GPS, take photos and videos, access the internet, and run apps, all on a single pocket-sized device. The traditional landline utilities, particularly in rural areas, continue to lose ratepayers and revenue as costs increase and the number of ratepayers decreases. The power sector is amid a similar type of transformation.

^aPew Research Center. 2010. "Assessing the Cell Phone Challenge." <http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/05/20/assessing-the-cell-phone-challenge/>

^bPew Research Center. 2010. "Assessing the Cell Phone Challenge." <http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/05/20/assessing-the-cell-phone-challenge/>

distributed energy resources (DERs) and efficient uses of power are decreasing sales volume, and hence revenue. Vertically integrated utilities are facing all these concerns. Addressing these concerns and others is key to implementing an incentive structure that will be fruitful from a utility and power sector owner perspective.

2.2 Utility Ownership Structures

The ownership structure of the utility matters in the PBR context just as much as the utility composition. The ownership structure determines the types of incentives structure that will have traction on the specific utility. Investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are concerned with providing a high and stable rate of return for investors. Publicly owned utilities are more likely to have political or societal objectives, but they also often must pay borrowing costs in the form of bonds, so they may act like IOUs in some regards, because they need to ensure they can pay their bond holders. Ownership structure drivers, either investor- or publicly owned, will also vary depending on their location and on the needs of the particular jurisdiction.

2.2.1 Regions with Investor-Owned Utilities

A subtle evolution is already underway in jurisdictions with investor-owned utilities. This evolution is from a regulatory emphasis on rate-of-return structure to more of an emphasis on direct performance incentive structures. PBR frameworks can look as different and novel as the United Kingdom's Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs (RIIO) and New York's Reforming the Energy Vision (NY REV) from 20th century power sector regulation. Alternatively, PBR can look like a carefully designed performance incentive mechanism (PIM, or set of PIMs) layered onto a more traditional regulatory approach. Regardless of the exact structure, the pace of technological change is putting energy tools into customers' hands that will require utilities to change how they do business. For that transition to work most effectively for utilities, customers, and other stakeholders, regulators will be

considering ways to change how they compensate utilities for doing business in ways they previously have not.

2.2.2 Regions with State, Provincial, or Other Governmental Ownership of Utilities

There are many different forms of governmental ownership and governance from state and provincial ownership governed by relevant agencies or ministries, to city- and municipally owned governed by local governments, boards, or commissioners, utility districts and cooperatives that are private non-profit entities governed by boards of utility customers, and other public and quasi-public entities. The institutional arrangements of these utilities will dictate how to consider appropriate PBRs discussed herein. An additional consideration for government-owned utilities is to assess whether PBR mechanisms will be enforced through internal incentives or through an independent government regulator. The effectiveness of compliance, reporting, transparency, and enforcement mechanisms would be part of that consideration.

2.2.3 Investor-Owned and State-Owned Utility Contexts

The nature of state-owned enterprises in China is quite different from the ownership structures of utilities in the United States and United Kingdom. Yet, the Chinese are adopting a system of revenue regulation transmission and distribution (T&D) reform that in principle parallels some Western regulatory systems. China has adopted an "allowed revenue" component of T&D price reform, and the central government has tasked certain provinces with developing outcome-specific PIMs for the grid companies. The PIMs will operate as overlays on the revenue regulation framework, targeting specific outcomes.³ Yunnan and Western Inner Mongolia are the first provinces to try this framework. The policy documents in these two provinces explicitly mention demand-side management (DSM) program performance as one of the criteria. This new T&D price reform will coexist with an older method

³National Development and Reform Commission. 2016d. Notice on Issuing Provincial Grid T&D Pricing Rule (Trial). (NDRC Pricing Department No. 2711). http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201701/t20170104_834311.html.

of regulating grid companies (gridcos), which is primarily a system of individual performance reviews for state-owned enterprise managers, based on specific target outcomes for the state-owned enterprise, including profitability and environmental performance.

PIMs appear to be part of the new T&D price reform in China, with some supplement to (or deduction from) revenues to be awarded (or subtracted) when a utility exceeds (or misses) a specific target for every item in the PIM, not only DSM.⁴ Depending on local formulation details, the PIMs may differ across provinces. Specific PIMs under discussion focus on capital usage, reliability, service quality, DSM, or other criteria, such as “innovation.”⁵

China’s new revenue regulation also takes Western approaches to control cost and capital investment in three primary ways:

1. Operation and maintenance expenses are required to be benchmarked with the advanced standard costs and capped at a certain level.
2. Gridcos’ capital investments are carefully examined to curb overinvestment, which does not serve load growth or reliability purposes.
3. Gridcos can share savings accrued with customers within the three-year regulatory period, if they operate more efficiently or reduce unnecessary capital investment.

India has recognized the importance of accurately measuring progress on utility financial and energy efficiency with utility-, state-, and national-level measurement schemes. Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY) is a PIM that is designed to facilitate financial and operational improvements among Indian distribution companies (DISCOMs). Progress is measured on an individual level against specialized targets for each DISCOM and Indian

state, and then at a national level to compare progress of all DISCOMs and states against each other. Initially UDAY states and DISCOMs are to be measured against their own metrics and targets, and progress is monitored on an “improvement barometer” that displays the post-UDAY cumulative progress (on an annual basis) made by the DISCOM on 14 selected parameters. For the first 12 parameters, the performance of the DISCOM is evaluated by comparing the achievement with respect to the targets submitted or memorandum of understanding projections. Calculations for assigning the marks against improvement are done quarterly and are based on data provided by the DISCOM. The quarterly rankings show how each DISCOM/state ranks against each other, thus providing a national dashboard and ranking of the comparative progress of each DISCOM.

Each one of the directional incentives mentioned previously for the UDAY initiative is to be measured accurately, that is, with smart metering to determine the benefits of system improvements such as upgraded transformers, energy efficiency (e.g., LED light bulbs sold and installed), reduced losses, and cost of power. For UDAY, it is also important to track incentives such as interest rates charged to state governments and financial measures, such as the gap between average cost of supply and average revenue recovered. The UDAY initiative has not reduced the incentives to formulas, but tracking of data will allow for evaluation of success of financial support in improvements in provincial utility operations, as well as refinement of the incentive structures, performance criteria, and metrics as UDAY and subsequent initiatives proceed.

Thus, in different contexts on different continents with different ownership structures, there are nonetheless efforts to use PBR mechanisms to pursue similar efficiency, renewable energy, and advanced technology goals.

⁴Ibid.

⁵ Capital usage, reliability, and service quality are in the national guidance document. The other criteria, such as DSM and innovation, are adopted in local T&D pricing regulation.

2.3 Institutional Arrangements Allocate Costs and Risk

In most utility structures, revenue growth is a predominant goal. Multi-year rate plans may slow revenue growth compared to regular cost-of-service regulation. For this reason, utilities may oppose PBRs unless the regulation relieves the utility of costs or risks it otherwise would bear. Conversely, if the PBR produces faster-than-expected revenue growth, consumer advocates and groups may oppose it.⁶ That tension may be productive if decisions on PBR are made transparently.

Any PBR scheme must account for factors that are significant in scale and beyond the utility's control that might affect metric achievement. For multi-year rate plans, an adjustment called a Z Factor is commonly used to identify factors outside the utilities' control. Advanced PBR target and metric setting can step beyond merely identifying risk within and outside the utility's control to consider who currently bears the risk of non-achievement, who pays for achieving or not achieving the goals, who can most efficiently address the risk (e.g., utility, consumers, or third parties), and how the risk will affect the utility's, customer's, and third parties' decisions.⁷

2.4 Examples of Underperforming Institutional Arrangements

There is evidence that the management of larger utilities receives higher compensation than their peers at smaller utilities.⁸ This means that whether in the United States, Europe, China, or elsewhere, a utility executive may desire to both grow the size of their utility and to perform well in order to move to other larger utilities or enterprises rather than perform well for the sake of current customers. In an environment that focuses on revenues and company size, this will reinforce the incentive to invest in large infrastructure projects and to grow revenue, which may or may not provide the most cost-efficient system for producing and delivering electricity. Thus, these outputs are driven by a separate executive compensation institutional incentive. For instance, in China, utilities have a strong PBR inherent in their state-owned structure: performance evaluations for China's state-owned enterprise grid company managers.⁹ The managers' performance evaluation focuses on economic criteria such as annual economic value added and net profit. Managers' income and promotion are directly linked to these evaluations, which has the potential to incentivize utility investment decisions that are not cost-optimal for the overall system.

⁶The Regulatory Assistance Project. 2000. *Performance-Based Regulation for Distribution Utilities*. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project. <http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-performancebasedregulationfordistributionutilities-2000-12.pdf>, p. 36.

⁷The Regulatory Assistance Project. 2000. *Performance-Based Regulation for Distribution Utilities*. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project. <http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-performancebasedregulationfordistributionutilities-2000-12.pdf>, p. 38.

⁸Lazar, J. 2011. *Beyond Decoupling, Creating an Effective Power Sector Framework for Clean Energy Objectives: Aligning Utility Business Models with Clean Energy Policies*. Unpublished manuscript. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project.

⁹For example, see Xia, J. 2015. *Study of Evaluation Methods of SOEs Manager's Performance for Inhibiting Corruption*. http://file.scirp.org/pdf/ME_2015101614064199.pdf.

3 Best Practices for Successful PBR Mechanisms

This section offers best practices for developing and designing successful PBR mechanisms. It focuses on the design process itself and on principles for approaching specific elements of the mechanism. This section is intended to provide guidance to decision-makers as they craft PBR mechanisms for their respective jurisdictions.

- **Key Point 1:** Elements of a successful PBR mechanism set up incentives to take advantage of technological innovation opportunities and accommodate the highly dynamic technology environment of the 21st century.
- **Key Point 2:** The important first steps in creating a PBR mechanism are to identify, articulate, and prioritize goals, then to understand how well or poorly conventional regulation meets those goals in a business-as-usual scenario.

The examples in the previous section of PBR mechanisms that worked (or did not work) are informative of design practices that help ensure a given PBR mechanism is successful. Such design practices include the following, which are discussed in detail in this section:

1. **Set Clear Goals.** If the goal is not clearly set, the metrics, incentives, and outputs will likewise not be clear and could lead to an unsuccessful mechanism.
2. **Identify Clear and Measurable Metrics.** Metrics should be able to be clearly identified, with measurable data that provide objective information.
3. **Establish Transparency at Each Step.** Transparency at each step of the process, including the development of goals, metrics, and incentives, often improves the quality of the final goals.

4. **Make Clear the Value to the Public.** The public values understanding the utility services for which they are paying.
5. **Align Benefits and Rewards.** When rewards and penalties are applied closely in time with utility performance, the relationship of incentive to performance is easier to assess.
6. **Learn from Experience.** Modifying PBRs to address operational observations is a good management practice.
7. **Apply the “Compared to What” Test.** The simple question of “compared to what?” looks for improvement in regulatory mechanisms along a continuous improvement pathway.
8. **Use Simple Designs.** To minimize the risk of gaming, the best bulwark against manipulation is to design a clear and well-defined incentive and metric or metrics.
9. **Employ Evaluation and Verification.** Evaluation and verification of the outputs represent an essential element of a successful PBR program. For information about evaluation and verification design practices, see Section 4.1.2.

3.1 Set Clear Goals

The important first steps in creating a PBR mechanism are to identify, articulate, and prioritize goals, then to understand how well or poorly conventional regulation meets those goals in a business-as-usual scenario. An honest assessment is needed and is not trivial, because it is a self-assessment by the regulator of its process or an independent governmental or third-party review. If reallocation of risk is being considered (often as between ratepayers and utilities), the stakeholders must understand who bears the risk now, how a shift in risk would affect investment and operational decisions, reductions in net risk through providing more certainty, and whether there are cost-management implications to shifting risk.¹⁰ The outcome of this

¹⁰ The Regulatory Assistance Project. 2000. *Performance-Based Regulation for Distribution Utilities*. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project. <http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-performancebasedregulationfordistributionutilities-2000-12.pdf>, p. 19.

Text Box 2. Key PBR Terminology

Guiding Goal (or Guiding Incentive)

A high-level PBR goal, referred to here as a guiding goal or guiding incentive, is informed by public policy priorities of the jurisdiction. An example could be a guiding goal to reduce ratepayer energy bills and utility rates through a strategy to limit the need to build a new or expanded transmission, distribution, and generation plant.

Directional Incentives

Directional incentives specify measurable performance criteria. They use measurable goals and metrics. A directional incentive for the guiding goal could be to reduce the overall growth of transmission system peak to less than 0.5% annually. Alternatively, a guiding goal of reducing new or expanded plant would have a directional incentive that is focused on the distribution system to limit the growth of any distribution system circuit peaks to less than 2% annually on any one circuit, and to achieve zero growth overall by deploying energy efficiency, demand response, and distributed resources on a locally targeted basis.

Operational Incentives

Operational incentives relate to the guiding goals and often the directional goals. Operational incentives provide metrics to measure operational considerations when implementing guiding or directional goals. Operational incentives can be positive (e.g., to improve system reliability) or negative (e.g., to limit reductions in reliability). They are also an important check on how regulated entities achieve a specific guiding or directional goal. For example, a guiding goal that calls for reducing new transmission and distribution lines or new generation plant or a directional goal that calls for deployment of distributed resources could impact system reliability if certain operational factors are not monitored. These guiding or directional goals can be paired with a related operational incentive that would require a certain level of system reliability based on historical system reliability metrics.

Measurable Performance Criteria

Expressing incentives with measurable performance criteria is a best practice when feasible. Measurable performance criteria allow for straightforward assessment of whether guiding, directional, or operational incentives are achieved. The assessment of whether goals

expressed as incentives are met is referred to variously as evaluation, verification, or compliance assessment—all these processes are meant to measure whether the intended outcome has been achieved and often whether a positive incentive is earned or a negative incentive is applied. Measurable performance criteria can be expressed in standard metrics when practical.

Metrics

A metric is a quantifiable measure of any incentive. A metric can be measured in standard power system measures or consumer impact measures. For example, reductions in system peak can be measured as a capacity reduction, such as megawatts, or as a percentage reduction from an already known prior peak, or as declining consumer energy bills. Metrics are often expressed in terms of energy capacity (megawatts) or energy generated or delivered (megawatt-hours or kilowatt-hours). A system reliability metric can be expressed as a measure of system interruption frequency or duration; a system average interruption frequency index and a system average interruption duration index are common reliability metrics.

Outputs and Outcomes

Outputs are specific results of utility actions, often measured as a measurable performance criteria or metric. Outcomes are how utility services affect ratepayers and society, and they are generally the desired results from a specific guiding goal, directional incentive, and/or operational incentive. The following examples illustrate these concepts:

- The output is a certain system average interruption frequency index result, and the outcome is reliable service.
- The output is x percent of calls to the call center answered in less than 20 seconds. The outcome is responsive customer service.
- The output is disconnections at less than x per month. The outcome is universal service.
- The output is interconnection of photovoltaic averaging x dollars in user costs accomplished on average in under y days. The outcome is motivating customer generation.

process could be that guiding principles support renewable development or could support DER adoption. The goals may also focus on cost-cutting or risk shifting.

One helpful way for considering PBR goals is as a set of guiding goals (or guiding incentives) informed by public policy priorities. These guiding goals are honed by more specific directional incentives that specify measurable performance criteria. The directional incentives are sometimes accompanied by a coordinated set of operational goals that also specify measurable performance criteria. Thus, goals can be guiding incentives with more targeted directional incentives using measurable goals/metrics, and/or operational incentives related to guiding goals. Although different jurisdictions use different terminology, we use consistent methodology, recognizing that in actual practice, variations on these terms will be encountered. Key PBR terminology we use in this report is listed in Text Box 2.

Guiding incentives set high-level goals that may or may not contain specific measurable performance criteria. A guiding incentive can also be a desired outcome, such as appropriately balancing benefits and costs, achieving least-cost service in the long run, realizing fairness, attaining equity, minimizing environmental impact, boosting energy independence, achieving economic development, or any combination of these. At the guiding incentive level, recognizing the importance of clear goal setting is critical.

Operational incentives to achieve operational goals can include reliability, customer service, and low-income customer protection. There is substantial experience implementing these traditional operational incentives to govern reliability and customer service. PBRs to encourage operational efficiency and low-income customer protection are both more innovative and more subject to trial and error. All PBRs should be designed with sufficient testing of baseline levels of performance and consideration of the costs and benefits of achieving desired outcomes. They should then be monitored during implementation with attention to whether the PBR is producing the intended results. For example, the NY REV process details each earnings adjustment mechanism (EAM) on a utility-specific basis, recognizing that the starting baseline, costs, and benefits of desired outcomes may vary across utility service territories and customer bases. And, for example, the low-income customer protections associated with NY REV are considered for each utility in light of that utility's prior low-income program success and failure, which vary from utility to utility.

It is also important to note that the PBR goals should be long-term. They should address what the regulator, utility, and stakeholders want the energy generation and delivery systems to provide to consumers in five, ten, and 20 years. Clear goals that are long-term in nature spanning a 15- to 20-year horizon or greater can provide the overarching guiding principles for a PBR framework. Text Box 3 describes the importance of long-term goals.

Text Box 3. Long-Term Goals and Costs are Important

The length of a goal is important, because the length of the term can affect how costs are evaluated. In the short run, many utility plant costs are fixed, but in the long run, almost all costs are variable. Looking out 15, 20, or more years, capital investments become variable costs and can be assessed as variable costs from a marginal cost perspective. This means that over the long run, capital investments increasingly become choices for system planners and regulators. The system may benefit from grid investments or may benefit more from other

actions that may avoid capital, such as paying customers for distributed resources like energy efficiency, demand response, customer-sited generation, or storage instead of a new power line, or paying a cloud computing company for a subscription service instead of a utility-owned information technology system. This shows that in the long run, almost all costs, including capital costs are avoidable. The opportunities to use substitutes for capital are growing with technology and increasing ways to use customers as grid resources.

3.2 Identify Clear and Measurable Metrics

A metric is a quantitative measure that is useful in assessing utility progress toward a desired goal or target. A metric is best if it is objective and under the utility's control.¹¹ Whereas directional incentives provide measurable performance criteria to evaluate whether the guiding incentives are being met, metrics are the medium through which measurable performance criteria are applied. Utility performance metrics can be thought of as a set of specific quantifiable outputs of work that represent aspects of utility service that are critical to successful outcomes. Each metric should have a specific measurable performance criterion against which results can be measured. Individual accomplishments related to each metric are scored relative to a reward scale to determine an incentive level.

Metrics can then be used individually or in combination to create a basis for an incentive reward.

Metrics work well if they can use a standard definition, or, lacking that, are precisely defined. Having relevant data to evaluate how close the utility is to achieving its goals is critical to determining the effectiveness of the directional or operational incentive. The availability of information applicable to the goals and metrics is necessary for awarding incentives or assessing penalties. Some basic considerations in setting metrics are:

1. Reliable data are a prerequisite to measuring utility performance. Data should be evident on their face and not subject to multiple interpretations. Ideally, data are available or can be made available so that results measured by metrics are more objective than subjective.



Figure 1. Metrics continuum

¹¹Widespread use of performance systems in institutions and settings as disparate as employment and foreign aid programs shows that the entity subject to the performance evaluation should have control over the factors influencing their performance.

2. If data are unavailable, consider how and who will develop them and who will verify the data under the metrics adopted.
3. Avoid the need for precision where precision adds little value, particularly compared to the cost of obtaining such precision.

Reporting obligations for performance criteria and metrics themselves can be a weak form of PBR. Establishing a reporting obligation communicates the importance of those performance criteria and metrics. The requirement that utilities track, analyze, and report specific information can encourage different utility behavior, be precedent to establishing incentives, and provide transparency that may allow other stakeholders to address utility performance through various regulatory, public, or policy avenues. Figure 1 illustrates the continuum of metrics for PBR, ranging from reporting metrics that are publicly available to public reporting of metrics with financial awards or penalties based on performance.

3.3 Establish Transparency at Each Step

Transparency can mean an open regulatory process or collaborative approaches among stakeholders, utilities, regulators, and other customers. For utilities, transparency has not always been understood as a regulatory necessity. On the other hand, stability at achieving traditional regulatory objectives is a critical utility business attribute. Most utilities are good at compliance with regulatory objectives and prefer to achieve compliance without much attention from the regulator. Compliance can be defined as performance that raises no issues when it is examined in a rate case or other commission investigation. Service meets expectations and cannot be characterized by regulators as either insufficient or more costly than necessary. Utility aversion to regulatory attention comes from a long history of utilities getting noticed when something undesirable occurs, such as an outage or major weather event. Adjusting to high transparency in operations and performance may require cultural adaptation at some utilities. In a related but different issue, utilities may resist publicly committing to a specific outcome. A utility may feel it can

meet said outcome but be reluctant to commit to it for fear of perceived failure by regulators or even the public. That said, increased utility transparency and commitments to outcomes are both required by PBR and, more broadly speaking, expected as part of the 21st century utility environment, with more stakeholders involved in offering coordinated and/or competing products with consumers who are interested in good outcomes for themselves.

Transparency is essential at each step of the process of establishing a PBR, including the development of goals, metrics and incentives, and it often improves the quality of the final goals. Stakeholders, utilities, and the public may have more refined targets and experience than regulators. And transparency can lead to utility, stakeholder, customer, and public buy-in, enhancing the credibility of targets and reducing the risk for (oftentimes very public) disagreements when rewards or penalties are applied. Transparency is important in the following ways.

Broad stakeholder involvement is critical. Transparency is important for the stakeholder process (1) for ensuring broad stakeholder groups are involved and (2) because including broad viewpoints and incorporating them into the process makes consensus more likely. Regulators have process options for receiving stakeholder views and information—through informal workshops and technical conferences, regulatory dockets with comments, and/or adjudicative proceedings. Irrespective of the process chosen, stakeholder involvement in developing goals, incentives, and metrics is essential, especially because what is at stake is changing *how* regulation is accomplished. Transparency also may provide the benefit of attracting broad stakeholder involvement from companies, investors, and market participants, particularly when they can understand the value proposition. It can also assist with demonstrating to financiers and others how companies will create profits as market participants.

Stakeholder involvement can lead to consensus. Stakeholder involvement can be critical to achieving consensus. By having stakeholders work together to (1) develop a list of goals, incentives, performance measures, and metrics for utility performance improvement and (2)

Text Box 4. Transparency in the U.K.'s RIIO Framework

U.K. regulators saw value in engaging consumers more directly in the design of RIIO than they did in prior efforts,^a as they concluded that getting a better understanding of consumers' perspectives was important to designing regulatory processes and policies that were aligned with consumers' preferences. The value of engaging consumers included improving the legitimacy of ratemaking and the performance evaluation processes:

- Ensuring the desired outcomes set forth by Ofgem were aligned with the needs of consumers.
- Assisting Ofgem with meeting emerging challenges in the power system, particularly around the transition to a sustainable energy system.

There are many ways that RIIO's PBR mechanisms encourage engagement with consumers and stakeholders.

For transmission:

- There is a stakeholder engagement incentive with a percentage of revenues available for companies based on how well they engage with their stakeholders.
- Metrics for assessing the credibility of the engagement include the:
 - Range of stakeholders whose views had been sought.
 - Information provided to stakeholders and the form the engagement took.
 - Impact of engagement (i.e., how network companies used the views expressed through engagement).

Each company receives a marking that can translate into an additional revenue allowance.

For distribution:

- Same stakeholder engagement scheme for transmission applies.
- Includes direct measurement of customer satisfaction for customers who have some direct dealing with the network company; this is judged through a survey in which Ofgem prescribes the methodology but which is conducted by the companies.

On reviewing this process in 2016, Ofgem found:

- Ranking has led companies to innovate and improve on how they engage beyond simply having a stakeholder panel.
- A broad focus on stakeholder engagement is needed rather than a narrow view of only consumer engagement, recognizing that this helps with considering a future consumer perspective in part through understanding future technology trends.
- The Consumer Challenge Group^b should be maintained, but transparency regarding the selection of consumer experts needs to be increased.
- The Price Control Review Forum (in which wider stakeholders and the industry meet to debate key issues) should also continue, but with a clearer articulation of its role as engaging a wider group of stakeholders and hence with a focus on building mutual understanding across different groups and information sharing. The process was found to be useful, but the breadth of issues covered by the forum did not allow sufficiently detailed discussions, given the group met only five times.
- Information on RIIO was often not presented in an accessible way, preventing stakeholders and consumers from providing responses.

^a Ofgem. 2010. *Regulating Energy Networks for the Future: RPI-X@20 Decision Document*. <https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/regulating-energy-networks-future-rpi-x20-decision-document>.

^b Frerk, M. 2016. *Consumer Engagement in the RIIO Price Control Process: Review*. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2017/01/consumer_engagement_in_the_riio_process_final_0.pdf.

consider how the utility will be rewarded and/or penalized as a result, the stakeholders may set the stage for more consensus building. Working together builds the relationship and opens dialogue among the parties, even when there are substantive disagreements. To the extent that consensus is reached, it reduces the risk for denial of requests for cost recovery. Utilities can have costs denied either in a request to increase rates or in finding that a particular cost or investment was imprudent. Energy efficiency collaboratives are an example of successful stakeholder engagements that many state utility commissions have used to resolve complex issues that emerge during a rate proceeding. Rather than debate the issues through the formality of a commission proceeding, disagreeing parties are sent to discuss issues in a less formal setting and bring back resolutions to the commission. Collaboratives for energy efficiency are being successfully used in more than half the states in the United States.¹²

It reveals the value of the PBR construct. A transparent process with broad participation provides a mechanism for regulators, stakeholders, and the utility to understand the value proposition offered by a PBR construct. For example, shared information and discussion can produce a comfort level regarding retail rate design and compensation levels. Consumers can participate in the development of metrics important to them. Utilities and investors may identify opportunities to increase earnings without shouldering the risks of traditional, large construction projects. Utility participation in stakeholder processes also affords utilities a sharper understanding of what is important to other stakeholders, and how achieving the goals of PBR constructs could improve their bottom line.

Text Box 4 illustrates the importance of transparency in the U.K.'s RIIO framework.

It is also important to note that transparency looks different in different contexts. The New York Clean Energy

Advisory Council is developing the energy efficiency EAM in a collaborative stakeholder process on a utility-specific basis to allow participation by both utility-specific and broader public stakeholders. This is focused utility-specific transparency. Under China's new T&D pricing reform, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) asked local governments to seek opinions from stakeholders, and it shares information with the central government and the public. This is seeking input from local officials in a context of perhaps less-direct customer engagement. Both forms of outreach can produce positive engagement with stakeholders and thus reflect the context of each jurisdiction. Consumer satisfaction can also be enhanced via measures intended to communicate directly with utility customers. Under RIIO, customer satisfaction has increased significantly, which seems to be a result of the published rankings as explored in Text Box 4.

3.4 Make Clear the Value to the Public

The public values understanding what utility services they are purchasing. A guiding goal with directional and operational incentives and performance criteria represents a transparent commitment from the utility to its customers and the public with an opportunity for reward. PBR can offer a clear "value for money" transaction to the utility, customers, and the public. Exceptional or beyond-compliance utility performance creates tangible value for specific customers or the public. A clear set of goals, performance criteria, and metrics that the public and stakeholders can understand is a benefit for them. And, they can be useful in a transition to a new regulatory model based on performance rather than rates.

It is also important that the value to the public be assessed appropriately to ensure clear value. Many regulators now design and implement more objective and verifiable customer satisfaction surveys. Regulators in

¹²Li, M., and Bryson, J. 2015. *Energy Efficiency Collaboratives*. State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network. <https://www4.eere.energy.gov/seeaction/system/files/documents/EECollaboratives-0925final.pdf>.

Massachusetts, for example, found that surveys with very specific questions and yes-or-no answers allow for more objective measures of customer satisfaction. This is significant, because poor performance on customer satisfaction can lead to substantial penalties.¹³

3.5 Align Benefits and Rewards

Aligning customer receipt of benefits through timely payment of rewards and incentives (or imposition of penalties, if negative impacts occur) is advisable to the extent practicable and feasible. When rewards and penalties are applied closely in time with utility performance, the relationship of incentive to performance is easier to assess. A close linkage can reduce the probability that regulators over- or under-reward utilities for performance in the eyes of customers. For instance, if consumers have a season of poor service quality, reduced utility revenue or penalties is more easily understood and assessed by customers, the public, and the utility itself, if done close to that season and with direct reference to seasonal service quality.

3.6 Learn from Experience

Learning from experience and modifying PBRs to address operational observations is a good management practice. The New York Public Service Commission (NY-PSC) observed in eliminating the penalty provisions of its energy efficiency incentives that the penalties resulted in an increased utility aversion to risk and created an adversarial dynamic between the NY-PSC and the utility. The NY-PSC also observed a drain on staff and utility resources to address these issues that would have been better spent administering the efficiency program.¹⁴

Because some outcomes are driven by influences partially outside utility control, utilities may be reluctant to accept a pure outcome target or metric. One method to address this is to consider a rolling multi-year average rather than a pure annual target or annual metric. Over time, the range of utility performance becomes evident as do trends in a rolling average. As an example, the U.K. regulator Ofgem, under the RII framework, implemented a rolling average target for reliability purposes. Specifically, an unplanned outage target is set based on either the minimum of a utility's 2014-2015 outage target or the utility's own four-year moving average.¹⁵ This is an example of an approach that regulators might use to implement targets or metrics in which utility performance may be subject to appreciable uncertainty.

3.7 Apply the “Compared to What” Test

It is also helpful in setting PBRs to apply the “compared to what?” test. PBR discussions can get mired in efforts to reach the perfect set of incentives (in a very imperfect world). It is easy to focus on areas that are not especially important and to lose recognition of how a proposal compares to the existing utility system.¹⁶ This question is helpful in designing programs and examining program improvements. It is a simple question that looks for improvement in regulatory mechanisms along a continuous improvement pathway.

¹³ Lowry, M., Woolf, T., and Schwartz, L. 2016. *Performance-Based Regulation in a High Distributed Energy Resources Future*. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Rep. No. 3. <https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/performance-based-regulation-high>, p. 30.

¹⁴ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 55.

¹⁵ Ofgem. 2012. *Reliability and Safety Working Group: Quality of Service*. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2012/07/rswg_17_may_slides_qos_0.pdf.

¹⁶ The Regulatory Assistance Project. 2000. *Performance-Based Regulation for Distribution Utilities*. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project. <http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-performancebasedregulationfordistributionutilities-2000-12.pdf>, p. 4.

3.8 Use Simple Designs

The best bulwark against risk for gaming is to design a clear and well-defined metric. If the metric, as well as the corresponding data required to evaluate it, are difficult to measure, manipulation can be more difficult to detect. This is especially the case if data are collected and analyzed by the utility, because conducting regulatory or third-party verification of the data accuracy and analysis is potentially expensive and difficult. Data collection and analysis that is difficult to audit or review should be avoided. Furthermore, third-party experts can be used to collect, analyze, and verify data when practical.

Although simple incentive designs are good and clarity for the public is important, designing proper goals, incentives, performance criteria, and metrics is not necessarily simple. Indeed, having smart and well-financed regulatory staff is critical for sophisticated PBR design and implementation. The best PBR designs are simple and clear but require substantial expertise, effort, and regulatory competence to achieve and implement successfully.

4 Design Elements and Options for Establishing and Implementing Successful PBRs

This section provides design options for establishing and implementing successful PBRs. It is intended to provide decision-makers with specific design elements within the PBR mechanism.

- **Key Point 1:** There is no “cookbook” for PBR approaches that can be taken off a shelf and implemented.
- **Key Point 2:** Although numerous successful PBRs exist to learn from, PBR approaches are continually evolving, and adapting a portfolio of PBRs (and PIMs) is necessarily specific to the context and goals in the jurisdiction.

4.1 Design Elements

Each PBR construct will be unique, as it should be crafted to reflect the specific policy goals of the jurisdiction in which it is implemented. For this reason, there is no “generic” PBR construct that can be implemented from a “cookbook” of successful PBR programs. However, there are some general design considerations for specific PBR elements *if* the element is necessary in a specific PBR. To reiterate, not all the following elements will be in each PBR construct, but if they are considered, consider the following.

4.1.1 How Performance Levels Are Set

The methods for determining and evaluating reasonable expected utility performance levels vary on a scale that one might call the “public’s ability to understand what

they are paying for.” Value should be demonstrable to the public. The public aspect of ensuring ratepayers and stakeholders understand the value of utility performance to the goals set is critical.

From the regulator’s point of view, getting the foundation of PBR set properly is critical. PBR schemes do not start from scratch—they are tied to a foundation. Incentives and penalties are set on top of a baseline. To get the baseline level right, regulators may need to model out and set prices for utilities functioning properly under a cost-of-service rate structure. PBR does not avoid the need to properly set base rates, and it can add to the regulatory burden. Regulators must first create a baseline, which may be cost-of-service regulation, and then design the incentives around the baseline.

A utility’s performance baseline can be determined from historical data if data were and are collected and maintained. A second method is to use peer utility performance data to determine either a baseline or a performance target. To identify a relevant group of peer utilities, a process known in the regulatory world as “indexing,” statistical and econometric methods are often used. Both methods rely on objective data sets (where available) and methods that are easy for the public to grasp.¹⁷

Some methods to establish performance baselines and targets are less easy to grasp in both concept and application, because they rely on statistical and engineering methods.¹⁸ A third method is a form of data envelopment analysis (DEA) called frontier analysis. Frontier analysis measures the efficiency of a sample of utilities, in terms of their inputs and outputs, to identify the most efficient utility operations. There is substantial complexity in the

¹⁷ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, pp. 36-37.

¹⁸ Statistical methods commonly are used for cost benchmarking for unit costs or productivity indexes and for econometric methods in rate designs. They are less commonly used to derive performance targets beyond traditional industry performance benchmarking. These two methods are state-of-the-art methods for PBR target setting.

statistical methods to exclude factors outside the utilities' control, as well as lack of internal validation, misspecification, and statistical "goodness of fit," all of which contribute to making this method more difficult for the average customer and even sophisticated customers to follow. The difficulty presented by methods like DEA and other complex models is that discussion over the model inputs, method, computations, and model results can distract regulators, stakeholders, and the utility from a focus on achieving utility outputs and outcomes desired by ratepayers and stakeholders. Nonetheless, despite these concerns, DEA analysis has been used in Austria, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway to benchmark and determine retail tariff levels and utility revenue requirements.¹⁹

A fourth method is to use utility-specific studies that rely on economic and engineering methods to set baselines or targets. Production cost simulations can model efficient power system dispatch. These models can be used to derive benchmarks for utility performance. California did just this to set generation dispatch performance incentives in the 1990s.²⁰ These latter two methods (DEA and production cost simulation) suffer from a lack of understandability for all but the most sophisticated utility and statistical experts. Moreover, the last two methods, DEA analysis and utility-specific studies, require detailed and sophisticated analysis that can lead to manipulation of a model or analysis to achieve tilted results, with little means available to compare those results unless historical data or peer benchmarking is used as well.

4.1.2 Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification

Evaluation and verification of the outputs achieved are essential to ensure ratepayers and the public receive the value anticipated in a PBR reward scheme. That said, evaluation of compliance and verification of benefits is a topic unto itself, and it is outside the scope of this report.

It is easier when metrics are clear and data are available and independently verifiable.

Beyond these general considerations such as establishing a proper baseline and having an evaluation, measurement, and verification plan, there are specific PBR design considerations, which are explored below.

4.2 Design Options

Depending on the objective and needs of each jurisdiction, there are a variety of PBR and PIM design options. This section focuses on PBR mechanisms with a proven record.

4.2.1 No Explicit Incentive

"No explicit incentive" represents a default scenario. However, it does not mean the system in place does not incentivize specific utility behavior. As mentioned earlier, all regulation is incentive regulation, and regulated entities will respond to the inherent incentives that are built into traditional regulation. A desire for no incentives is a position often held by consumer advocates and industrial groups that want the absolute minimal rates, desire minimal ratepayer risk, and believe it is the utility's obligation to operate its business as efficiently as possible without any additional remunerations from ratepayers.

There is a variant of no explicit incentives: jurisdictions that rely only on penalty authority. This might extend to regulators who believe that any desired utility output or behavior can be ordered by the regulatory authority. The implicit incentive in a "penalty-only" jurisdiction is to avoid actions that would run afoul of the regulator's view of utility behaviors, outputs, or outcomes worthy of a penalty, which include experiencing a serious reliability failure or simply not following regulator orders. Assessing what incentives exist, even in jurisdictions with no explicit incentive structure, is important.

¹⁹ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 37.

²⁰ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 37 and Footnote 17.

4.2.2 Shared Net Benefits

Under shared net benefit incentives, the utility would share along with ratepayers in the benefits associated with, and identified from, the metric achieved. This can mean sharing in financial benefits between the utility and ratepayers. In the context of energy efficiency programs, a “shared savings” approach is often used in the United States to recognize and share the energy efficiency savings between ratepayers and the utility.

A shared net benefits approach needs to be carefully thought out and implemented to clearly identify the shared benefits, ensure the utility appropriately controls costs, and ensure the mechanism cannot be gamed. Implementation of shared savings schemes can be difficult because the focus on evaluation, measurement, and verification, which is the concept of shared net benefit’s inherent imprecision, and translation to dollars can negatively impact a utility–regulatory relationship. This approach relies on accurate benefit calculations through evaluation and measurement, and a clear evaluation, measurement, and verification plan based on objective metrics is the best remedy for this issue.

Shared net benefit mechanisms can blunt the incentive for utilities to control costs, which is otherwise a prime motivation for implementing PBR constructs. To ensure cost control incentives are maintained in a PBR scheme with a shared net benefit construct, the mechanism can be designed to apply only to benefits outside a band where earnings are not affected. A “deadband” approach adopts a range around a performance level that results in no modification or incentive until the range is exceeded.²¹

Shared net benefit regimes also need to be carefully designed to avoid the possibility of gaming. For example, in the context of a shared savings mechanism for cost of natural gas, a large U.S. utility was ordered to refund \$72 million to ratepayers when it manipulated its gas storage to release gas it had purchased previously at a lower cost. In this case, the gas in storage had a year-vintage, so the utility chose to release gas from a very low-price year to artificially produce a “cost savings” under a shared savings PBR.²² And, in this case, the ability of the utility to control purchase and sale times with no relevant performance guideline left the system open to manipulation.

4.2.3 Program Cost Adders and Target Bonuses

Program cost adders provide a payment to the utility for costs of a particular program. Target bonuses provide a payment for hitting a specified performance metric. Program cost adders and target bonuses can be used when a program has a direct utility cost. The program cost adder can be a simple percentage paid to the utility based on program cost. This type of program cost bonus is often a share of a specific program, and administrative costs are tied to achieving a target or goal. Of significance, it is tied to expenditures and not savings. For this reason, there may not be disincentive for the utility to control program costs.

Target bonuses are, simply put, a one-time financial incentive for achieving a specific performance criteria or metric. This approach has been criticized for being discontinuous (i.e., minus one unit of performance gets nothing, the next unit hits the bonus jackpot). When regulators want to drive a quantum leap in performance, and when more than that specific amount is not useful, this bonus approach is simple and works.

²¹ For example, no sharing of savings from energy efficiency may be appropriate within a band of energy efficiency savings of 0.00 to 0.02% of sales, which are expected to be produced through market forces, such as enhanced appliance efficiency standards. So, as designed, a sharing mechanism with a “deadband” operates as a reward for only exemplary performance for marked increases (or decreases) in performance. For more information on shared net benefit mechanisms and deadbands, see The Regulatory Assistance Project. 2000. *Performance-Based Regulation for Distribution Utilities*. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project. <http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-performancebasedregulationfordistributionutilities-2000-12.pdf>, p. 4.

²² Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 94.

4.2.4 Base Return on Equity + Performance Incentive Payments to Reach Maximum ROE Cap

Under a base ROE PBR, the utility earns a base ROE, and that return then increases (or goes down) based on a performance incentive structure that rewards (or penalizes) performance with modifications to the ROE. The utility can increase its ROE through performance incentive adders up to a maximum PBR payment or set of payments. And poor performance can potentially decrease the ROE as well. The regulator assigns a value range for a series of metrics, for which the utility would receive a return if it satisfies the metrics assigned. The incentives can also scale higher or lower if certain values are achieved with the specified range. The adder value may vary from metric to metric based on the value assigned by the regulator. A more complex option is to provide a range that provides a level of incentives for satisfying the target and a higher incentive for exceeding it. In establishing this type of PBR mechanism, a regulator may ask the following:

- At what level should the base ROE be set in the event the utility does not meet any of the targets? Should this amount be its approved ROE from its last rate case or some amount lower or higher?

- What level of maximum allowable ROE incentivizes good behavior without causing the utility to over-earn at the expense of ratepayers?
- What metrics should be subject to an incentive adder?
- For the metrics chosen, what value range should be assigned to each?
- How much reward should be given for each metric so that the sum-total of all the metrics equals the maximum cap with the base ROE?

For example, the NY-PSC in the REV process has allocated 100 basis points of return broadly across all EAMs. Each utility then has EAMs set in the context of a rate case in which those points will be allocated among those mechanisms.

Text Box 5 illustrates the importance of properly designing bonus ROE programs.

4.2.5 Bonus ROE for Capital for Projects or Programs

A bonus ROE for capital invested in a project or program provides additional ROE for capital rather than program costs. This is more consistent with traditional rate base

Text Box 5. Poorly Designed Bonus ROE Example

An example of a poorly designed bonus ROE plan is the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) incentive-based rate treatment of transmission investments. To broadly improve transmission reliability and reduce congestion, FERC's Order No. 679 awards the transmission utility a higher rate of ROE for new transmission investment. There is no requirement to quantify the benefits of a given investment in relationship to overall costs, and by applying the ROE adder to the project's actual (not budgeted) costs, utilities and transmission developers have a perverse incentive to increase project

costs. This incentive is estimated to have cost ratepayers in the six New England states alone hundreds of millions of dollars in added charges, which increased the costs of delivered energy. Much if not all of those transmission projects would likely have gone forward without any incentive scheme, so the incentive merely increased costs to ratepayers.

Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 94.

principles of allowed ROE only for capital investments in utility plant but tends to favor heavy capital investments. This approach has been used for energy efficiency, and it could certainly be used for other types of projects. When used, it tends to encourage capital-intensive efficiency investments, and it has been disfavored for that reason. An additional downside is this mechanism rewards capital spending (an input) rather than outcomes. To avoid a pure spending/input flaw, a bonus ROE for capital could be awarded only if triggered by exceptional output performance.

4.2.6 Base Incentives on kWh Reduction Targets

A base incentive for meeting kWh reduction targets would enhance ROE for meeting reduced load target metrics. A reduced load in absolute terms or a reduced load growth could be a PBR directional incentive. Reduced load can occur through deployment of varied distributed resources, including efficiency and distributed generation. If properly designed, this form of PBR could recognize and reward utilities for investments and system modifications that reward efficiency and distributed resources. If improperly designed, it could provide a payment for reductions that new technologies and consumer investments will produce anyway. Furthermore, this directional incentive alone may still also allow over-investment in utility plants if not joined with other PBR mechanisms to address the Averch-Johnson effect.²³ For example, even if load growth is reduced to zero, utilities still may pursue reliability-oriented projects to continue to invest in rate base.

4.2.7 Peak Reduction Targets

On a system in which growth in peak demand is driving generation, transmission, or distribution investments, system-wide savings are potentially available from efforts to reduce system peaks. This can be true on a system-wide

basis and may be true for individual grid zones or even distribution circuits. Where investments that reduce peak demand can defer or avoid altogether the need for new and more expensive investments, overall system costs can be reduced. PBR mechanisms can be designed to incentivize utilities to pursue these types of cost-saving investments.

New York's Brooklyn-Queens Demand Management program is an example of a PBR arrangement that reduces system peak. This program was implemented by Consolidated Edison (Con Edison) with encouragement and ultimately approval of the NY-PSC to avoid the need for an expensive new substation and other load-related items totaling over \$1 billion, for a less expensive set of DER solutions and a smaller set of traditional grid upgrades. Con Edison was allowed a regulated rate of return on its DER investments and an additional 100 basis points if specific objectives were met. The guiding goals were to achieve "DER animation" and "lower costs to customers" with the 100-basis-point incentive tied to specific metrics: 45 basis points for achieving 41 megawatts (MW) or more of alternative measures, 25 basis points for increasing diversity of DERs in the market place (more contracts with a greater number of small DER providers), and 30 basis points for assembling a portfolio of solutions that achieves a lower \$/MW value than the traditional investment solution. For this last metric, such \$/MW value was based on the present value of the lifecycle benefits and costs of the portfolio and the traditional investment. For example, if the portfolio includes measures that result in reduced energy usage or increased renewable energy generation, those benefits can be included in the lifecycle analysis, thereby reducing the resulting \$/MW metric.²⁴ In this way, the NY-PSC and Con Edison used a complex PBR construction using both ROE on DER investments and additional basis points to achieve 41 MW or more of peak load reduction to avoid a more expensive set of traditional grid investments.

²³ The Averch-Johnson effect is identified by economists as the tendency of regulated companies to engage in excess capital investments to increase their profits.

²⁴ NY-PSC. 2014 (December 12). Order Establishing Brooklyn-Queens Demand Management program. Case 14-E-0302, pp. 21-22.

Arizona and California²⁵ are considering a different version of a peak reduction strategy to encourage development of clean resources through a “clean peak demand standard” implemented through a renewable portfolio standard.²⁶ This proposal would both increase the renewable energy (renewable portfolio) requirement *and* add a requirement that new resources be available to meet the net system peak. The net system peak is the time when electricity demand, less wind and solar generation, is highest, and it is increasingly moving later in the day when the sun sets, owing to increased solar generation on the system.²⁷

4.2.8 Every Employee with a PBR Goal, Target, and Metric?

Historically, PBR mechanisms have acted on the utility and not on individuals at a utility. However, PBR can be applied to individuals as well, as examples from China illustrate. The concept is that every utility employee has at least one metric in the PBR system that applies to their work and that can be used to evaluate eligibility for performance-based compensation. Achievement of goals and metrics can raise the visibility of program managers and units within a utility. Enhanced visibility of relevant business units for each goal within the utility can create positive incentives with respect to performance in accordance with the goals and targets. This suggestion is in some regards unsurprising, as many utilities use incentive bonuses for managers and sometimes for employees too, including

stock options and stock price options. If utility performance influences the stock price, executives or employees benefit and often help meet those performance goals.

For state-owned utilities, these enterprise-wide incentives are typically in the form of employee reviews and promotion opportunities, including opportunities at other state-owned enterprises. Applying PBR on the individual level is being pursued in China. The Chinese grid company evaluation criteria were modified in 2016 when the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council decided to include “social benefit” criteria in the evaluations of state-owned entity grid companies. These will reflect activities that “serve social objectives” or are “essential to national security and economic operation.” Although details have yet to be decided, these criteria may include outcomes such as improvements to reliability in underserved and rural areas, “green technology development,” and support for philanthropic efforts. How this change will affect grid company behavior is yet to be fully evaluated. China’s grid utility revenues were traditionally derived from the difference between administratively set—and rarely revised—retail and wholesale prices. Transmission and distribution reform is currently evaluating Chinese grid company revenue.²⁸ Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the overall set of incentives faced by grid company executives is undergoing a significant shift.

²⁵ California Assembly. Bill 1405. 2017–2018 Regular Session. An Act to Amend Sections 454.52 and 9621 of the Public Utilities Code, Relating to Electricity. http://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1405; and California Senate. Bill 388. 2017–2018 Regular Session. An Act to Amend Sections 454.52 and 9621 of the Public Utilities Code, Relating to Electricity. http://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB338.

²⁶ Trabish, H. 2016 (December 9). “Arizona Proposal Seeks to Mandate Renewable Generation During Peak Demand Hours.” *Utility Dive*. <http://www.utilitydive.com/news/updated-arizona-proposal-seeks-to-mandate-renewable-generation-during-peak-demand/432031/>.

²⁷ Huber, L. 2016 (December 1). *Evolving the RPS: A Clean Peak Standard for a Smarter Renewable Future*. Berkeley, CA: Strategen Consulting. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571a88e12fe1312111f1f6e6/t/58405ac4d2b85768c5e47686/1480612551649/Evolving+the+RPS+Whitepaper.pdf>.

²⁸ China’s power sector reform effort, launched in March 2015 with the issuance of “Document #9,” includes a new approach to gridco regulation called “transmission and distribution (T&D) pricing reform” that, in principle, is similar to revenue regulation. Under the new approach, grid company revenue will be subject to revenue regulation, based on the basic concept that allowed revenue equals “approved costs” plus reasonable return on asset base. The revenue of the grid companies will be approved for three-year periods. All three state-owned enterprise grid companies in China (State Grid, Southern Grid, and Inner Mongolia Power Company) are to be covered. Chinese officials framed this approach to gridco regulation to shift away from the status quo with limited regulatory access to gridco financial information and a lack of transparent cost review and price setting. And, Chinese authorities are publicly discussing increased transparency, improved government oversight, and reduced costs.

That said, unintended consequences can result from a PBR system on individuals and can create perverse incentives. For example, when the California Public Utilities Commission required reporting of employee injury data for rewarding workplace safety, it found that supervisors encouraged non-reporting, self-treatment, or treatment by personal physicians and other measures to avoid internal reporting of injuries. Furthermore, the reporting of injury data by group and incentives provided on a group basis within the utility led to employee desires to see their group or unit safety rankings maintained, and thus created a disincentive to report injuries.²⁹ The lesson from this experience is that careful consideration of internal data management and reporting within the utility may be necessary, particularly when there is a reward-and-penalty aspect of an incentive that affects individual and group employee compensation.³⁰

²⁹ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, pp. 31, 63-69.

³⁰ Another booby trap is that a focus on a specific metric may take employee attention away from tasks that do not have a reward or any reported metric and instead focus their time on tasks that do influence achievement of performance targets, such as the customer experience or societal benefit. Regulators can address this with a broader array of metrics that are reported without reward (a scorecard) such that all utility performance is subject to public disclosure and a likely future correction.

5 Conclusion

PBR mechanisms vary widely by jurisdiction, as they should. Following a design process that considers the institutional arrangements and then sets clear goals, an articulated design process will help jurisdictions implement successful PBR mechanisms.

The first step in the process is to understand the institutional arrangements within a jurisdiction, which have incentives inherent in the structure. Consideration of the utility composition is critical to understanding both the concerns the utility is facing with respect to technological change and how the utility will respond to incentives. The ownership structure determines the types of incentives structure that will have traction on a specific utility.

Elements of a successful PBR mechanism set up incentives to take advantage of technological innovation opportunities and accommodate the highly dynamic technology environment of the 21st century. As a result, the process should focus on clearly articulating goals—not methods or technology. The important first steps in creating a PBR mechanism are to identify, articulate, and prioritize goals, and then to understand how well or poorly conventional regulation meets those goals in a business-as-usual scenario. There is no “cookbook” for PBR approaches that can be taken off a shelf and implemented. But, past PBR successes and failures are a source of guidance. Opportunities to learn by comparison continue, because while numerous successful PBRs exist, PBR approaches are continually evolving.



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Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation

VOLUME 3

Innovative Examples
from Around the World

VOLUME 1

VOLUME 2

VOLUME 3

Next-Generation Performance- Based Regulation

Volume 3: Innovative Examples from Around the World

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
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The Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation Report in Three Volumes

This three-volume report is based on the material found in *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation: Emphasizing Utility Performance to Unleash Power Sector Innovation*,¹ which, like this report, was created for the 21st Century Power Partnership (21CPP). Since 2012, the 21CPP—an initiative of the Clean Energy Ministerial—has been examining critical issues facing the power sector across the globe. Under the direction of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), 21CPP provides thought leadership to identify the best ideas, models, and innovations for the modern power sector that can be implemented by utilities and governments around the world.

An earlier 21CPP report, *Power Systems of the Future*,² published in 2015, summarizes the key forces driving power sector transformation around the world and identifies the viable pathways that have emerged globally for power sector transformation, organized by starting point as illustrated in Figure P-1. In 2016, the 21CPP published an in-depth report describing the Clean Restructuring pathway originally elucidated in *Power Systems of the Future*. A related pathway identified in *Power Systems of the Future* was Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation, and this report builds on that.

Figure P-1. Present status and adjacent pathways to power system transformation



Source: Zinaman, O., Miller, M., Adil A., Arent, D., Cochran, J., Vora, R., Aggarwal, S. et al. 2015. *Power Systems of the Future: A 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership Report*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-6A20-62611. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62611.pdf>.

¹ Littell, D., Kadoch, C., Baker, P., Bharvirkar, R., Dupuy, M., Hausauer, B., Linvill, C., et al. 2017. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation: Emphasizing Utility Performance to Unleash Power Sector Innovation*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. <https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68512.pdf>.

² Zinaman, O., Miller, M., Adil A., Arent, D., Cochran, J., Vora, R., Aggarwal, S. et al. 2015. *Power Systems of the Future: A 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership Report*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-6A20-62611. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62611.pdf>.

With this report, we have divided the full *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation* report into three volumes:

1. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 1: Introduction—Global Lessons for Success
2. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 2: Primer—Essential Elements of Design and Implementation
3. *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation*
Volume 3: Innovative Examples from Around the World.

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List of Acronyms

AT&C	aggregate technical and commercial
DER	distributed energy resource
DG	distributed generation
DISCOM	distribution company
DSO	distribution system operator
EAM	earnings adjustment mechanism
ERDF	Électricité Réseau Distribution France
ESCO	energy service company
EV	electric vehicle
IRP	integrated resource planning
MW	megawatt
MWh	megawatt-hour
NREL	National Renewable Energy Laboratory
NY REV	New York's Reforming the Energy Vision
NY-PSC	New York Public Service Commission
PBR	performance-based regulation
PIM	performance incentive mechanism
PREC	Puerto Rico Energy Commission
PREPA	Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
PV	photovoltaic
RIIO	Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs
ROE	return on equity
T&D	transmission and distribution
UDAY	Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana
VRE	variable renewable energy

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1 Introduction

In this volume, Volume 3, of the *Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation* report, we focus on how performance-based regulation (PBR) can be used in this era of rapidly changing technological trends, and we survey current innovative PBR options in the world. First, we examine current technological trends in the power sector and evaluate how these trends are changing the structure. These trends include the penetration of disruptive technologies, decentralization of supply, enrollment of the demand side in the power sector, increase in cross-sectoral integration, and increase in intelligence and digitalization of networks. We then explore how these trends are challenging the current system and how PBRs can play a role in power sector transformation.

We feature examples of innovative PBR designs from around the world. These examples are meant to show the wide range of ways PBRs can be used and the variety of goals the mechanisms can achieve. Some of the examples are theoretical and are suggestions for new ways to apply PBRs, and others are real-world examples.

2 How PBRs Can Support Power Sector Transformation

This section highlights key trends in the power sector, what we think we know about the path these changes may take, and what we cannot know, and it notes the implications of these trends for power sector regulation. The section suggests paths forward for regulation to harness and accommodate changes that are to some extent difficult to entirely predict.

- **Key Point 1:** The acceleration of technology innovation in power markets is challenging many long-held paradigms and requiring new approaches to planning, procurement, system operations, public policy, and regulation.
- **Key Point 2:** PBR is a form of the regulation that can harness disruption while providing utilities with the flexibility to reach the measurable performance criteria. It does so by specifying goals for utility performance, utility outputs, and outcomes for consumers and society, while staying agnostic to the exact means of delivery.

We are now entering a period of rapid change in many power sectors around the world that is motivated by a range of technology, policy, market, and business model drivers. The next section takes stock of certain key evolutions in the power sector and what we know about the path these changes will take, and it assesses the implications of these trends for power sector regulation.

2.1 What Is Changing

After nearly a century of fairly incremental technology improvements in the power sector, the industry is now experiencing a period of rapid change brought about

by technological innovation and evolving public policy objectives. This section briefly highlights five key trends that have implications for power sector regulatory approaches:

- Penetration of Disruptive Technologies (Section 2.1.1)
- Decentralization of Supply (Section 2.1.2)
- Enrollment of the Demand Side (Section 2.1.3)
- Increasing Cross-Sectoral Integration (Section 2.1.4)
- Increasing Intelligence and Digitalization of Networks (Section 2.1.5).

2.1.1 Penetration of Disruptive Technologies

Technology disruption is driving transformation in many industries, including in the power sector. Cost reductions of variable renewable energy (VRE) (e.g., wind and solar)—in combination with competitive procurement structures—are making these resources the lowest-cost form of new-build generation in many contexts, and they are driving rapid deployment. Battery energy storage, although still nascent in many respects, is an increasingly popular option to manage the supply and demand of electricity, support stability in local grids, and provide the flexibility needed to integrate VRE resources. Technologies such as LED bulbs and lights are already helping flatten load growth in many jurisdictions. A range of other emerging end-use technologies, coupled with automation and information and communication technology, present novel opportunities to enroll the demand side of the power sector and promote greater integration of power with other sectors. In general, the growing ubiquity of technology innovation in power markets is challenging many long-held paradigms and requiring new approaches to planning, procurement, system operations, public policy, and regulation.

2.1.2 Decentralization of Supply

The combination of increasing VRE deployment and the increase of distributed energy resources (DERs)³ is resulting in an increasing decentralization of supply in some power markets. Geographically dispersed fleets of VRE resources are changing network investment strategies and creating new challenges for regulators to evaluate the prudence of network investments. Sharply declining DER costs, particularly for distributed photovoltaic (PV) systems, are accelerating public policy dialogues about the desired role of distribution utilities in 21st century power systems in which some consumers produce their own electricity. What constitutes fair compensation for consumers selling power to the grid has also proven to be a complex and contentious issue. Furthermore, with the power grid largely designed for unidirectional power flow, utilities and regulators are now grappling with how best to efficiently invest in their network infrastructure to enable greater integration. This decentralization of supply is driving a need for greater operational cohesion of distributed resources,⁴ and the rise of VRE and DERs is thus strongly complemented by the trend of increasing intelligence and digitalization of the power sector.

2.1.3 Enrollment of the Demand Side

The demand side of the power sector has historically been unresponsive to supply-side conditions.⁵ New technology is now enabling customers from all segments to behave more responsively to the real-time price of energy and enabling them to receive payments for shifting their demand when grid conditions require it. This is occurring

through both regulated utility programs and private third parties; in both scenarios, an entity is responsible for aggregating groups of customers, calling on them to reduce demand when needed, and facilitating a payment for services. Demand response programs are growing in number and sophistication, with some aggregation schemes allowing participation in wholesale power markets. There are still many technical and regulatory barriers to entry, with unresolved issues in many markets concerning, among other things: access to customer and market data, the role of third-party aggregators, and reliability of and fair compensation for demand response resources. As increasing amounts of low-cost VRE drive the need for greater system flexibility, the aggregation of demand response may prove to be a valuable resource for many power systems.⁶

Customer load factor⁷ and load shape⁸ data are very valuable for determining the optimal customer, circuit, and distributed resource approaches for the most efficient system design. DERs offer the potential to serve a range of customer loads with distinct load factors and load shapes to realize efficiencies simultaneously for the customer and the broader utility system. However, a utility may or may not benefit financially from some DER solutions and could in fact lose revenue under certain circumstances. If utilities exercise sole control over consumer load data and are not required to share, there exists a very real possibility that this information will never be shared with DER providers or customers, as it may show a solution that saves consumers money or reduces utility investments.

³ DERs are modular, geographically dispersed, and often smaller-scale technologies that allow consumers to produce their own energy, manage their consumption, and participate more actively in the power system. They include distributed generation such as solar PV, storage, electric vehicles, demand response, heating and cooling systems, and smart home automation.

⁴ Zinaman, O., Miller, M., Adil, A., Arent, D., Cochran, J., Vora, R., Aggarwal, S. et al. 2015. *Power Systems of the Future: A 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership Report*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62611.pdf>.

⁵ A notable exception is the example of large industrial customers (e.g., aluminum smelters) that enter into interruptible load demand response contracts with utilities, often for contingency events.

⁶ In competitive markets, the energy service company (ESCO) business model is predicated on monetizing a portion of the value associated with saving consumers money on their electricity bills. ESCO revenues are generated by sharing the savings achieved and are thus driven by reductions in savings from retail prices. Whether that model can now extend into energy supply and potentially wholesale markets is an open question.

⁷ Load factor is the ratio of a customer's or location's average or actual electricity usage to peak load, usually over a period such as a billing period or annually (average load as a percentage of peak load).

⁸ Load shape is a user's or location's energy consumption pattern over time, such as daily, monthly, seasonally, or yearly.

Utility management, whether the utility is privately or publicly owned, is often motivated toward large investments that increase rate base (the Averch-Johnson effect).⁹ Traditional cost-of-service regulation sets a rate of return on rate base,¹⁰ and so the utility is incentivized to increase revenue (and earnings for shareholders if privately owned) by investing in its own plant. Early forms of PBR were designed to counter the Averch-Johnson effect by allowing utilities to keep savings from efficient operations. This early form of PBR—multi-year rate plan mechanisms—set electric rates and adjusted them for inflation and productivity. Utilities that operate with fewer costs than what was approved in the last rate case (adjusted for inflation and productivity) can keep some or all of the savings. In this way, multi-year rate plans reward cost control (see Section 3.2.1). This means that between rate-setting proceedings, prices increase as a function of inflation, and are reduced by expected productivity gains, but not as a function of capital investment. Not only do DER investments potentially reduce the need for utility investments, DERs also reduce utility sales volume, which reduces utility revenue in the short run. The utility desire to build rate base and increase the volume of sales (the “throughput incentive”) gives utilities two strong structural incentives to resist DERs, even in scenarios in which they are the lowest-cost resource option available. These factors can become barriers to deploying DER solutions in some jurisdictions.

2.1.4 Increasing Cross-Sectoral Integration

The electrification of previously un-electrified economic sectors, such as transportation and heating (in some jurisdictions), presents further opportunity to enroll the demand side and reduce system costs. Electric vehicles (EVs) may offer a near-term opportunity for utilities to grow demand for electricity,¹¹ with over 2 million plug-in vehicles on the

road globally by the end of 2016 and substantial immediate-term growth expected.¹² EVs, through intelligent charging protocols, can use their batteries to provide local power quality services, avoid expensive peaking generation for the system, and help balance supply and demand to integrate VRE. Time-of-use pricing schemes can enable EV owners to reduce their electricity bills by charging when energy prices are low. Similar to EVs, electric heating loads such as heat pumps or district heating systems can be enrolled and aggregated to provide valuable grid services. In this case, the thermal inertia of residences and buildings can be used as a form of storage to help shift demand with a minimal impact on the heating services provided. In general, this increasing trend of electrification and cross-sectoral integration may increase stress on local grids, and it may require careful automation protocols and sufficiently granular pricing mechanisms to prevent network infrastructure from becoming overloaded. In an era of increasing DERs (and stagnant/shrinking demand in developed economies), the prospect of increasing sectoral integration and electrification offers a new and perhaps much-needed opportunity for utilities to grow revenues.

2.1.5 Increasing Intelligence and Digitalization of Networks

In addition to innovative generation and demand-side technologies, new investment is flowing toward a broader interconnected system of intelligent networks; this has largely been enabled by the growing ubiquity of sensors, data collection systems, and information and communication technology, and driven by a need for greater cohesion among distributed resources within the power system. As discussed in the previous subsections, the prospect of aggregation and coordination of many individual customers, some of whom may be generating

⁹The Averch-Johnson effect is identified by economists as the tendency of regulated companies to engage in excess capital investments to increase their profits.

¹⁰For publicly owned systems with no private shareholders, there is still revenue and earnings pressure. Universally, lenders (bondholders) demand certain coverage ratios to justify investment-grade interest rates and enable reasonable retail rates that drive revenue concerns. Other hidden incentives for growth include federal and global aid programs in which loan administrators pursue volume of loans and grants placed. A related concern is setting administrator salaries keyed to the size of the electric system.

¹¹In an era of growing rooftop solar (and stagnant or shrinking demand in developed economies), the prospect presents an exciting opportunity to expand business for many utilities.

¹²International Energy Agency. 2016. *Global EV Outlook: Beyond One Million Cars*. https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Global_EV_Outlook_2016.pdf.

their own power, requires the implementation of increasingly smart and real-time controls throughout the network. Networks are increasingly rich with data, and through automation and real-time analysis, there are substantial opportunities to unlock demand-side resources,¹³ increase situational awareness and resiliency, and send granular price signals to consumers and producers to incentivize behavior. However, this raises a host of new issues around, among other things: communication, management, and privacy of network data; growing cyber and physical security considerations; appropriate equipment and communication standards; establishing appropriate levels of data access for the private sector; and equitable cost and risk allocations for network investments.

The regulator's job in overseeing a utility with significant customer-sited resources will involve new challenges and functions. The question then becomes, how can a regulator with new challenges interact in the most productive manner with utilities and customers to achieve efficiencies and higher levels of service for customers who increasingly have differentiated load shapes, usage, and even generation patterns.

2.2 What We Cannot Know About What is Changing

Although we cannot predict the precise evolution of the power systems of the future, we are able to identify trends. Here too there is a caveat: we do not know all the trends. But we do have a sense of the existing trends. This is tricky as well, however, because we do not know at what pace and how each specific trend will develop. Or indeed, whether another trend will overtake and influence what we know is changing. So, although we have a good sense of direction, we are not able to predict pace, precise development scenarios, and most especially disruptive trends. To accommodate technological, adoption, and disruptive certainty, we want to design regulatory structures to accommodate future outcomes consistent with a wide variety of future scenarios, all of which are plausible.

In the 20th century, power grid and power sector regulatory paradigms were designed to have flexibility to address uncertainties such as demand variability (daily and seasonal variations, fuel price fluctuations, and failures of system components, such as failures of one or more generators). The underlying energy markets for traditional fossil fuels can be very dynamic. These markets can be subnational, national, and international, and fuel prices are often volatile, so supply input economics vary just as electricity demand has varied. The regulatory models adequately addressed these uncertainties.

In the 21st century, advanced energy technologies such as battery storage and grid-enabled vehicle charging create new resource types with new capabilities and integration challenges. Battery storage may enable demand management heretofore unheard of, and looks sometimes like a generator, sometimes like a customer asset, and other times like a distribution or transmission asset. Regulators are still grappling with how to classify storage under traditional regulation and understand its true value to the grid.

Technologies, networks, and new applications are emerging very quickly and so are consumer expectations of the grid to provide the value they anticipate. Some consumers expect more opportunities for increased control over their energy use, and they assume new technologies will provide them with attractive options. As with transformative technology, business models of industries will start, end, or evolve as the waves of change move forward. Recent history is replete with transformative technology change that was not foreseen by experts.

Can regulators and utilities know what's changing? Energy consumption has been over-predicted for six decades, which suggests that even the experts and regulators predict energy trends incorrectly. Figure 1 illustrates this error, showing the projected natural gas well head price projections, and comparing it with actual prices.

¹³ At a time when renewable electricity is increasing variability on the supply side, intelligent demand will be an increasingly important dispatchable resource. Jager, D., Bucquet, C., van Rooijen, S., and Petrick, K. 2015. *Implementing Agreement for Renewable Energy Technology Deployment. Annual Report 2014*. International Energy Agency. <http://iea-ret.d.org/documents/2015/05/2014-annual-report-iea-ret.d.pdf>.




Figure 1. Historic Natural Gas Wellhead Price Projections (in color each year) and Actual (in black).

Source: US Energy Information Agency, *Annual Energy Outlook Retrospective Review: Evaluation of 2013 and Prior Reference*

2.3 Regulation for the Era of Disruptive Technology

With so many transformational elements permeating the power sector, there is a growing focus on governing institutions to enable change and “get out of the way” of technological innovation. In practice, regulatory bodies are often at the center of these dialogues around how exactly, and at what speed, to allow technological disruption and business model innovation to enter the market. Although regulatory approaches must be satisfactorily customized and locally appropriate, we offer that a new wave of “*regulation that harnesses disruption*” is needed to keep pace with technological innovation. In principle,

this disruptive regulation should be sufficiently flexible to adjust to an ever-changing suite of technology, resource, social, political, and energy market drivers, but at the same time hold steadfast and unwavering in the ultimate outcomes desired for consumers.

We further offer that PBR—by specifying expectations of utility performance and outcomes for consumers while staying agnostic to the exact means of delivery—constitutes a form of this much-needed regulation that harnesses disruption. We consider PBR as one tool in a broader toolbox in the transition toward flexible regulatory and market structures that rewards utilities that adapt or evolve in reaction to market and technology change.¹⁴

¹⁴ Miller, M., Martinot, E., Cox, S., Speer, B., Zinaman, O., Booth, S., Zissler, R. et al. 2015. *Status Report on Power System Transformation*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63366.pdf>.

Zinaman, O., Miller, M., Adil, A., Arent, D., Cochran, J., Vora, R., Aggarwal, S. et al. 2015. *Power Systems of the Future: A 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership Report*. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62611.pdf>.

3 Innovative PBR Approaches

This section offers innovative approaches to reach public policy goals. It is intended to provide decision-makers with ideas, some of which are in existence, some of which are theoretical, on how to reach specific public policy goals with a PBR mechanism.

- Key Point 1: PBR is an extremely flexible regulatory tool that allows regulators, utilities, and stakeholders to pursue desired goals, outputs, and outcomes for electric utility performance.
- Key Point 2: PBR can pursue goals across an immense spectrum of utility performance to provide appropriate incentives for utilities to change their performance in specified areas of interest or concern for regulators, policymakers, and utility stakeholders.

As illustrated in the previous sections, PBR has evolved greatly since its inception over two decades ago. Performance-based regulation is now being used in a variety of jurisdictions worldwide in innovative and wide-ranging ways. A selection of innovative PBRs and performance incentive mechanisms (PIMs) is examined here by topic area. Unlike the PBRs listed previously, not all the mechanisms here have been implemented, nor do they have a lengthy history of implementation. These mechanisms are examples of innovative ways in which PBR is being applied. It is anticipated that, like the predecessors examined in previous pages, the experience with the mechanisms listed here will yield further lessons in the future on best practices. This is not an exhaustive list, but it should provide an overview and inspiration for the different ways PBR is or could be applied to different aspects of electric utility regulation. Section 3.1 lists areas that could utilize PBR, but which have not yet been proposed. Section 3.2 lists innovative applications of PBR and PIMs.

3.1 Areas Ripe for PBRs

3.1.1 Incentives for Water Savings

There have been significant regulatory responses to water shortages in various jurisdictions. Until very recently, California has been faced with a multi-year drought, but its concern with reducing water usage by power plants is longstanding, based on desires to reduce ocean and coastal ecosystem impacts. As a result, the state adopted the mandatory retirement of once-through cooling facilities for all its generating plants and required dry cooling on some of its natural gas power generators. Nevada requires dry cooling on all new generation, but this is enforced at the water permitting level. None of these requirements is set up as a PBR mechanism, but rather as traditional regulatory requirements, which is surprising given the power sector's significant use of cooling water.

To date, a PBR scheme to provide an incentive to conserve or avoid water usage has not been adopted. A PBR for water savings from a baseline year for cooling water usage can be easily envisioned based perhaps on overall water withdrawals, or simply consumptive uses accounting for evaporation, aquatic life impacts from withdrawals, and thermal impacts on receiving water bodies. A second approach could apply a benchmark for water consumed (on a consumptive standard) per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity generated or purchased and be applied at the utility level or at the distribution utility level in restructured markets. Performance below the baseline or benchmark could be rewarded, and performance above those levels could be penalized. Performance-based regulation, although uncommon in the electricity sector, has been used in the water utility sector to encourage water conservation in areas with water shortages. The Southern Nevada Water Authority, for example, has very aggressive pricing and lawn removal programs.

3.1.2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance

Greenhouse gas emissions reduction is an area ripe for PBR. The guiding goals, directional incentives, performance criteria, and metrics are readily able to be calculated and tracked. A well-designed PBR scheme could allow utilities to select the most cost-effective means of achieving greenhouse gas reductions and reward utilities for doing so. In fact, an emissions standard has been put forward as a regulatory standard for states to consider during the Clean Power Plan discussions in the United States. This concept is transferable to a PBR.

At least one jurisdiction has adopted a metric for greenhouse gas emissions reductions; this was in a settlement reached in Illinois in 2013 regarding cost justification for advanced metering infrastructure. The settlement—by parties interested in justifying the cost of advanced metering infrastructure—requires a performance metric to be developed by the utility Commonwealth Edison to track reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (as measured through load shifting, system peak reductions, and reduced meter-reading truck rolls attributable to smart meters and associated time-of-use rate modifications).¹⁵ The settlement includes metrics to calculate power plant marginal emissions changes and changes in generator dispatch attributable to load shifting of smart meter customers compared to non-advanced metering infrastructure customers on an hourly level. Other metrics are to be developed for greenhouse gases to track plant closures that may occur from reductions in system peak, and reductions in fuel consumption from reduced meter reading vehicle rolls broken down by specific operating centers.¹⁶ Reporting and development of these metrics may provide sufficient regulator and utility experience, which can then be refined and used to build goals with incentives and performance criteria in the future. Indeed, developing

experience with accurate performance criteria that can be used to set goals and to measure those accurately is one of the prerequisites to successful PBR.

3.1.3 Locational Metrics for Reliability or High-Cost Areas DER Deployment

For telecommunications systems, locational reliability is often measured by circuit. This is not done for electrical service but could easily be implemented with the advent of smart grid monitoring technologies. Circuit reliability, certain customer service measures (e.g., circuit-specific system average interruption duration index or system average interruption frequency index) or power quality could be measured with devices installed at substations, feeders, and customer meters. Initially circuits could be selected with a history of service issues, or where high levels of DER penetration are changing circuit characteristics.

By concentrating DERs in a high-cost utility area (i.e., an area where short-term marginal costs of system improvements are high), DER investments may help defer or avoid grid upgrades. Infrastructure and operation cost savings can offset utility revenue losses and make net savings available for a PBR shared savings to reward utilities for cost reductions and innovation.¹⁷ This is perhaps most easily accomplished in vertically integrated utilities where savings from DERs in supply and utility plant accrue to the utility itself but also could be quite valuable to a distribution company.

Sharing of location energy data to designate high-cost utility areas for DER development can be structured into a PBR mechanism. The structure of the PBR system would incent the utility to provide customers and third-party developers with data on where DERs are most desirable, that is, have the highest system value. This is what New York did with the Brooklyn-Queens Demand Management

¹⁵ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 84.

¹⁶ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 86.

¹⁷ The Regulatory Assistance Project. 2000. *Performance-Based Regulation for Distribution Utilities*. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project. <http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-performancebasedregulationfordistributionutilities-2000-12.pdf>, p. 40.

project discussed in Volume 2; the utility provided incentives such as direct payments to DER providers or customers, direct DER investment by the utility where legally authorized, or facilitated competitive procurements among DER providers, with payments to DER vendors capped at the utility savings, to direct DER development to these high-cost areas.¹⁸ The utility was allowed to recover the costs of DER assets acquired by it and also an additional return on equity (ROE) adder if it was successful in acquiring adequate demand-side reductions through its DER acquisition process. Although this can be described as a shared savings system (and this program is described in Section 6.2.7), implementation occurred through an ROE adder and allowed recovery of utility costs for direct utility procurement of DER assets in a particular high-cost area. The measurable performance criteria and metrics were for specific load reductions to be achieved through DER procurements by the utility itself.

Utility savings can be calculated using the short-run marginal cost of distribution and electrical supply. So, although New York's Brooklyn-Queens project incentive was an ROE adder, this structure resulted in shared savings. The shared savings consisted of ratepayers avoiding additional distribution costs and Con Edison receiving some of these savings in the form of an ROE adder. These total savings can be expressed in short-run marginal avoided costs of major substation upgrades. Again, in theory, the price of a good or service should be equal to its short-run marginal costs under conditions of competition. The Brooklyn-Queens project demonstrated that a short-run marginal cost of avoided distribution system costs could indeed be the costs of acquiring a suite of DERs. Moreover, in efficient markets, the short-run marginal costs should equal the long-run marginal costs.¹⁹ The Brooklyn-Queens project demonstrates that under conditions of low load growth, the marginal costs of additional DER infrastructure may indeed represent the short-run and long-run marginal system costs.

3.1.4 Incentives for EV Rate Education and Charging Station Deployment

Retail EV rates are being adopted or piloted in some jurisdictions. Because these rates are new and little understood by ratepayers, there is a need for better marketing of the availability and design of such rates to various customer classes when they are implemented. This is an area of potential for PBR application, yet the design of an effective PBR system for EVs presents design dilemmas with which jurisdictions. For example, should the focus on educating consumers be on home charging rates or on building out public EV charging infrastructure, and perhaps include attention to consumer protection for public charging sales? The public charging infrastructure is quite expensive and if allowed in rate base, utilities probably have adequate incentive to build that infrastructure. Rather, the use of high-cost charging infrastructure may become the primary concern, but the use of charging stations is generally beyond both utility and regulator control. The number of EVs in use may influence use of charging stations, but that is certainly beyond utility and regulator control. For these reasons, focusing on education on home charging rates is riper for utility education and consumer interface. Indeed, modest utility support for home charging infrastructure could increase consumer adoption and load-growth of clean energy.

The multi-year rate plan, an early form of PBR, may provide an approach to incentivize utilities to market new EV rates to customers. Utilities under a multi-year rate plan may be able to retain or share in revenue growth from revenue of EV-based rates between rate cases. Multi-year rate plans would provide an incentive for utilities to market attractive EV rates to ratepayers for home EV charging because utilities would enjoy increased revenue. In this manner, growing consumer usage through home EV charging is entirely consistent with the multi-year rate case model developed in the United States. In states with multi-year rate plans and where utilities have marketing flexibility, the multi-year rate plan approach has potential to become a powerful driver of EV charging usage and interest among utility customers.

¹⁸ The Regulatory Assistance Project. 2000, p. 41.

¹⁹ The Regulatory Assistance Project. 2000, p. 41, Footnote 16.

For jurisdictions that have utilities preparing infrastructure for EV charging stations, the utilities' work could be considered for PBR in the context of the jurisdiction's guiding goal. If the guiding goal is to prepare infrastructure for charging station completion, a measurable performance criterion might be utility make-ready work performed for EV charging station completion. National Grid has proposed such a performance criterion in Massachusetts that will be considered by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities. Under the terms of the proposed National Grid program, EV charging sites would be owned by independent vendors with National Grid providing assistance. The program would include a performance incentive for National Grid, with a maximum award representing 5.5% of the total program budget. The incentive would be awarded for each EV charging site developed and activated. The threshold for receiving the minimum award of \$750,000 would be activation of 105 sites, or 75% of the program target. The maximum award of \$1.2 million would be earned if 175 sites (125% of the program target) were activated. The petition is currently under consideration.²⁰

3.1.5 Compliance with Codes of Conduct in Support of Competition

Codes of conduct govern how utilities (and their affiliates) interact with companies that compete with them. Historically, monopolies did not have competition once they achieved a dominant position in the market. In the 21st century, competitive opportunities could emerge

through restructuring of the electric industry²¹ or through energy services companies.²² Even in restructured markets, utilities maintain monopoly positions over certain services and will often have superior economic resources and access to customer and market information and system knowledge that competing companies cannot match. If a utility can use its economic and information advantages, there is the risk it can drive out competitors and operate as a deregulated monopoly, exercising market power. Although the rules to prevent anticompetitive behavior can be detailed and in a certain respect quite distinct among jurisdictions, there are basic principles that govern the establishment of rules:

1. Discrimination in providing access to essential services should be prohibited.
2. There should be no sharing of competitive information among companies affiliated with the utility.
3. Cross-subsidization by the utility to benefit a competitive enterprise, such as an affiliate, should be prohibited and carefully monitored.²³

Many U.S. states enacted codes of conduct as part of their restructuring procedures.²⁴ Examples of codes of conduct include the New York Public Service Commission (NY-PSC) order as part of the proceedings on New York's Reforming the Energy Vision (NY REV),²⁵ Pepco Holdings,²⁶ and Dominion Resources, Inc. as between its affiliates in North Carolina and Virginia.²⁷ Texas also has a comprehensive

²⁰ National Grid. 2017 (January 20). Petition of National Grid for Pre-Approval of Electric Vehicle Market Development Program, and of Electric Vehicle Program Provision. Docket 17-13. http://170.63.40.34/DPU/FileRoomAPI/api/Attachments/Get/?path=17-13%2fInitial_Filing.pdf.

²¹ Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have adopted electric retail choice. EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration). 2012. Electricity Retail Choice 2010. <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6250>.

²² See for example, the New York Reforming the Energy Vision proceedings, NY DPU Case 14-M-0101, February 26, 2015, among others; DC PSC, Formal Case No. 1130, In the Matter of the Investigation into Modernizing the Energy Delivery System for Increased Sustainability; California PUC, Distribution Resource Plan. <http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/drpf/>.

²³ Migden-Ostrander, J. 2015 (November). "Power Sector Reform: Codes of Conduct for the Future." *Electricity Journal* 28(6), p. 4. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285216738_Power_Sector_Reform_Codes_of_Conduct_for_the_Future.

²⁴ An example of a code of conduct filed in Ohio by the Customer Coalition for Choice in Electricity. 1999 (October 13). In the Matter of the Promulgation of Rules for Electric Transition Plans and of a Consumer Education Plan Pursuant to Chapter 4928 Ohio Revised Code. Case No. 99-1141-EL-ORD. Appendix C. http://dis.puc.state.oh.us/TiffToPdf/J_YLZ8DECRL5YXDH.pdf.

²⁵ NY-PSC. 2016 (September 15). Order Setting Standards for Codes of Conduct. Case Nos. 15-M-0501 and 14-M-0101. https://www.energymarketers.com/Documents/utility_code_of_conduct_DER_order.pdf.

²⁶ Pepco Holdings. (undated). Codes of Conduct. <http://www.pepcoholdings.com/codes-of-conduct/>.

²⁷ Dominion. (undated). Code of Conduct Governing the Relationships Between Dominion North Carolina Power, its Affiliates and the Nonpublic Utility Operations of Virginia Electric and Power Company.

Table 1. Utility Code of Conduct Areas

Type	Description
Nondiscrimination	Utility provision of the same services and information to all competitors, including its own affiliates, without preferential treatment for its affiliate Utility provision of the same information sharing and disclosure to all competitors, including prohibition of sharing information with affiliates that is not shared with competitors
Corporate identification and logos	Use of a different name and logo from the parent to eliminate customer confusion and avoid a name-recognition competitive advantage
Goods and services	Transfer of goods and services to, and sharing of facilities with, an affiliate only at market price to the regulated utility for any goods or services received to avoid a subsidy from ratepayers and prevent it from gaining a competitive advantage Sharing equipment and cost sharing does not occur between the utility and distribution company except for perhaps corporate services.
Joint purchases	The utility should not be allowed to make joint purchases with its affiliate that are associated with the marketing of the affiliate's products and services.
Corporate support²⁹	Shared corporate support must be priced to prevent subsidies, be recorded, and be made available for review.
Employees	The utility and its affiliate(s) do not jointly employ the same people, with the only exception being shared directors and officers from the corporate parent or holding company.

code of conduct addressing the affiliate relationship.²⁸ All these codes of conduct are fairly similar in substance and put into practice the three basic principles described previously. These concepts can be applied to multiple aspects of a utility business in which a regulated utility or its affiliate enters the market to offer a competitive service. Table 1 describes various common aspects of utility codes of conduct for utilities interacting with their own affiliate companies, as well as with competitors.

For codes of conduct to be effective there needs to be regulatory oversight, including requirements for compliance plans and audits to ensure adherence. The utility should maintain a compliance procedure and log in which it records all informal complaints and their disposition. The regulator needs to have the ability to levy penalties for non-compliance.³⁰ It is unusual for violations of codes of conduct to be adjudicated by regulatory officials, and a PBR scheme can incentivize compliance (or incentivize noncompliance) much more efficiently than a regulatory adjudication.

²⁸ Texas PUC. (undated). §25.272. Code of Conduct for Electric Utilities and Their Affiliates. <https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/rulesnlaws/subrules/electric/25.272/25.272.pdf>

²⁹ Corporate support means overall corporate oversight, governance, support systems, and personnel. Any corporate support shared by the utility and the competitive entity should be priced to prevent subsidies and should be recorded and made available for review. The use of combined corporate support should exclude the opportunity to transfer confidential information, should not provide preferential treatment or an unfair competitive advantage, and should not lead to customer confusion.

³⁰ Migden-Ostrander, J. 2015 (November). "Power Sector Reform: Codes of Conduct for the Future." *Electricity Journal* 28(6), p. 4. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285216738_Power_Sector_Reform_Codes_of_Conduct_for_the_Future.

Furthermore, the expected nature of compliance and violations as deviations from acceptable norms may form the basis for creating a negative incentive or penalty.

A PBR incentive for compliance with codes of conduct would be closely associated in concept with support for competitive DER markets, but it would also be distinct because it would focus on corporate separation and compliance with codes of conduct. The PBR metrics could track the number of complaints of violations made to the utility. Complaints most often go directly to the utility; thus, a requirement to keep a log to document the complaints is necessary. Because competitive companies depend on goodwill and utility relationships, they may be reluctant to file complaints. For that reason, the utility log of complaints can be a useful tool. The logs will indicate the resolution of issues as well as spot recurring problems. Unresolved matters or serious complaints would be addressed at the regulator level through separate complaint processes. The information obtained by the regulator can be used to form the basis of metrics regarding utility interaction with competitive DER providers.

3.2 Innovative PBRs that are in Operation

The following PBRs or PIMs are innovative examples of how jurisdictions around the world are using PBR.

3.2.1 Incentives for DER Implementation

PBR frameworks are ripe with opportunity to help address the negative incentives utilities face—and which are often inherent to traditional cost-of-service regulation constructs—to achieving efficient levels of DER deployment. PBR can be used to set incentives for greater DER penetration. Performance-based regulation for DERs can seek greater system efficiency through specific directional incentives tied to DER provider satisfaction, or DER deployment metrics of other system measures.

DER deployment is often assessed in terms of (1) number of DER systems deployed, (2) the total installed capacity of DER on a system (kW or MW), or (3) if applicable, the total amount of energy produced from DER units (kWh or

MWh). These three fundamental metrics represent merely the first steps in PBR for DER deployment, and they can be used to establish directional incentives that lead to greater system efficiency through DER deployment. It can be difficult to translate directional incentives to measure utility DER penetration, formulate performance criteria, and set actual metrics for DER performance. Assessing DER provider satisfaction using a well-developed survey represents one way to develop innovative measures such as those being implemented in New York. DER incentives are relatively new, and as such, are being structured in a variety of forms that doubtless will evolve as some are judged successful and others less so.

3.2.1.1 *Distributed Energy Resource Provider Satisfaction*

The NY REV initiative is an exemplar of this PBR approach. It is designed to establish coordinated PBR to motivate utilities to look for system efficiencies whether they are achieved on the grid through utility grid-level investments or at customer premises through customer and third-party DER solutions. NY REV's incentives are designed to reward utilities for DER provider satisfaction and customer satisfaction while encouraging strong transparency. The NY REV initiative recognizes that system efficiency can be achieved through either utility investments or customer and third-party DER solutions, and it attempts to alter utility incentives to allow for an assessment of the most cost-effective and beneficial set of solutions among utility, customer, and third-party providers.

One difficult issue jurisdictions will consider in structuring PBR mechanisms focused on DER is setting an appropriate baseline of expected business as usual (i.e., no utility intervention) DER deployment. DER markets and technologies are rapidly evolving, and investment decisions are made by consumers for a variety of reasons that can be difficult to project or model. Notably, many DER deployment drivers are outside the direct control or influence of utilities. This makes it difficult to set a PBR mechanism to determine which DER deployment should be attributed to the utility, and what would have happened without any utility involvement. As a result, directly attributing specific utility activities to DER deployment (i.e., measuring a

utility's value-add) may be a challenge. A baseline must be developed before a PBR mechanism can be created, and starting with an *ex ante* baseline is difficult because DER technologies markets are emerging (see Section 4.1.1 of Volume 2 of this report for more on setting baselines). The inability to develop a baseline or predict DER deployment trends poses a challenge in developing directional incentives as well as measurable performance criteria and PBR metrics. If a baseline is developed, any DER deployment in excess of this baseline could in theory be attributed to the utility, for the purposes of PBR. In practice, however, formulating proper baseline assessments against which to create a performance incentive for DERs is challenging. Although methodologies to conduct baseline DER deployment estimates are outside the scope of this report, it is important to note that conducting these studies in public, and with sufficient stakeholder review and input, is a good practice that can only increase the validity of the estimates. The approach taken in NY REV of using sophisticated DER provider surveys to assess utility performance in DER facilitation has a significant virtue of avoiding the challenging task of developing a baseline against which to measure utility facilitation of DER deployment.

The NY-PSC recognized that establishing a baseline for DER deployment is particularly difficult. Rather than simply track DER interconnection requests with no way of evaluating the quality of the interconnection process, the NY-PSC instead focuses its PBR for DER on a survey of DER providers. The sophisticated survey of DER providers, which is still under development in the stakeholder process, is meant to assess how well utilities are working with DER developers on interconnections and identifying targeted locations on the grid system where DER may have high value to reduce load.

The use of surveys by New York to assess utility performance on DER deployment goals is particularly innovative.

There are at least two problems with simplifying measuring interconnection times, application, or quantity, which New York may be able to avoid by using surveys. The first problem is that simply measuring interconnection times and applications processed can be easily gamed by utilities quickly denying interconnection requests. Measuring interconnection time and applications processed does not measure whether meritorious applications are approved and applications with technical difficulties are denied—and it is very difficult to objectively measure the merits of approvals and denials without detailed knowledge of each distribution circuit. The second problem avoided is that measuring DER quantity in numbers or DER energy generated/avoided may measure outputs or outcomes that are more dependent on exogenous factors than on how the utility handles interconnection requests. These exogenous factors include local market dynamics and third-party energy service company activities that influence the quantity of DERs installed but are largely exogenous to utility operations. Refinement and implementation of these DER provider surveys will occur in upcoming years in New York. Text Box 1 discusses how California regulators induced utilities to consider non-wires solutions to distribution system reliability needs.

The New York PBR survey of DER providers will in theory incentivize timely and quality reviews of DER interconnection requests. Utility performance will be assessed based on surveys of DER providers and satisfaction of standardized interconnection requirements³¹ as a threshold condition. Favorable survey outcomes will result in a positive earning adjustment under NY REV. For projects over 50 kW, the earnings adjustment mechanism (EAM) will have the following components:

1. A threshold condition based on adherence to the timeliness requirements established in the standardized interconnection requirements

³¹ Standardized interconnection requirements address technical guidelines for interconnection and application procedures, with two separate sets of interconnection procedures: an expedited process for systems up to 50 kW and a basic process for systems greater than 50 kW and up to 5 MW. Both processes include interconnection process timelines that the utility must meet, responsibility assignments for interconnection costs, and procedures for dispute resolution, as well as many technical requirements for the systems. Utilities are required to maintain a web-based system that provides information on the status of interconnection requests.

Text Box 1. Non-Wires Alternative Requirement in California

In December 2016, the California Public Utilities Commission approved a mechanism that seeks to induce utilities to consider non-wires solutions to distribution system reliability needs. Reliability needs on the distribution system may be precipitated by load growth or by the growth of certain DERs, and traditional distribution investments undertaken to address these needs include measures like reconducting circuits to higher voltages, replacing transformers, or even expanding a local substation. However, the reliability needs may also be addressed through adding local reliability services that do not require traditional wires investment solutions. Non-wires services that may address an emerging need include increased distribution capacity services, voltage support services, back-tie reliability services, and resiliency services.¹ DERs that can meet some or all of these needs include energy efficiency, demand response, storage, and distributed PV and other distributed generation (DG) resources, and a portfolio of these DERs is likely to be constituted to meet the specified needs. Each utility is required to identify a significant

upcoming distribution system investment need and to solicit proposals to meet the need with portfolios of distributed resources. Each utility is required to specify the reliability services that are needed to address the need, and to issue a request for proposals to procure the needs. The submitted proposals are to be evaluated based on a technology-neutral, least-cost, best-fit basis. If the most cost effective, best value proposal is superior to the distribution wires investment solution, the utility will be required to enter into a contract with the winner. A *pro forma* contract will be developed over time to make the non-wires contracting process more routine. The utility is entitled to recover all costs of administering the non-wires solicitation and, as compensation for an effective solicitation, the utility will be entitled to earn 4% on the annual contract cost of the contracted non-wires alternative.

¹ CPUC (California Public Utilities Commission). 2016. Decision Addressing Competitive Solicitation Framework and Utility Regulatory Incentive Pilot. Rulemaking 14(10) 003, p. 8.

2. A positive adjustment based on an evaluation of application quality and the satisfaction of applicants with the process, as measured by:
 - a. A survey of applicants to assess overall satisfaction
 - b. A periodic and selective third-party audit of failed applications to assess accuracy, fairness, and key drivers of failure to support continual process improvement.

The NY-PSC will also consider on a case-by-case basis the negative earning adjustments for failure to meet established standards.

As part of NY REV, the NY-PSC has a separate EAM specifically for DER deployments. A DER utilization EAM encourages New York's largest utility, Con Edison, to expand use of DERs to reduce customer reliance on grid-supplied electricity and for beneficial electrification.³² The DERs falling under this EAM initially are solar PV systems, combined heat and power, fuel cells, battery storage, demand response, thermal storage, heat pumps, and EV charging. DERs will be measured in terms of the annualized MWh produced, consumed, discharged, or reduced from incremental (new to the rate year) resources. Because not all DERs are individually metered or measured, MWh produced or consumed by incremental DERs will be counted through default factors for DER energy usage and consumption.

³² Dennis, K., Colburn, K., and Lazar, J. 2016 (August). *Environmentally Beneficial Electrification: The Dawn of "Emissions Efficiency."* Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project. <http://www.raponline.org/knowledge-center/environmentally-beneficial-electrification-dawn-emissions-efficiency/>.

3.2.1.2 Solar Distributed Generation

A guiding goal of a PBR regime can be to encourage solar distributed generation (DG) or to encourage utility, consumer, and solar DG developer communication and cooperation in effective interconnection. A good first step toward this goal is to facilitate transparency on connection levels, including methods to facilitate communication between the utility, customers, developers, and the public.

In 2013, Hawaii adopted utility performance metrics for DER deployment. These included measurements of the number of net energy metering³³ program participants and installed solar DG capacity, as well as enrollment numbers for utility demand response and storage programs. These metrics are to be posted on the utilities' websites to facilitate transparency of information on DER levels for utility customers.³⁴ There are no incentives associated with these metrics.

To address the customer and stakeholder's desire for information on DER deployments and application processing, Massachusetts used "dashboards."³⁵ Dashboards are computerized summaries of key data on specific topics such as solar DG deployment presented on a web-based portal. Although not an incentive mechanism per se, dashboards can set up very effective communication methods with customers, the public, and DER developers. Moreover, graphical presentation of dashboard data involves presentation of DER information (number of units, capacity, energy produced, geography) that comprises a number of metrics that set public reporting obligations similar to specific performance criteria. Dashboard and energy data

portals transform a set of goals or targets into the reporting, tracking, and presentation of information that provides the public with an understanding of which metrics are important to assess utility and power system operations.

3.2.2 Incentives for Sharing Utility Data

Using real-time energy cost and usage data systems is critical to optimize the efficiency of energy production and delivery.³⁶ However, utilities are inherently reluctant to do so, as there are barriers to overcome and no incentive to do so. Sharing these data can foster system optimization by facilitating access to utility and customer data that allows for more efficient decisions. Sharing of specific customer data usually requires customer consent; thus, data usage systems must also facilitate customer consent. Alternatively, utilities can share anonymized data as part of an evolving platform function.³⁷ If energy cost and usage information becomes more transparent, customers and providers can use this information to make more efficient decisions to reduce their costs and increase the value of their energy systems for their specific needs.

To share data more freely, it is often necessary to address barriers that prevent DER providers from obtaining both utility and customer data. Third-party clean energy technology companies view the lack of a utility incentive to easily share utility and customer data (again with customer consent) as problematic, particularly because these data would provide opportunities for them to offer alternative solution sets to consumers, provide lower costs of customer acquisition, and compete with utilities for certain

³³ Hawaii has since terminated solar net energy metering.

³⁴ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 89.

³⁵ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 32.

³⁶ Fox-Penner, P. 2010. *Smart Power: Climate Change, the Smart Grid and the Future of Electric Utilities*. Island Press; Valocchi, Michael, John Juliano, and Allan Schurr. 2010. *Switching Perspectives: Creating New Business Models for a Changing World of Energy*. IBM Inst. for Business Value.

³⁷ The NY-PSC noted the evolving role of the utility and the potential platform services utilities could offer. In the Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework, the NY-PSC noted that "utilities will have four ways of achieving earnings: traditional COS earnings; earnings tied to achievement of alternatives that reduce utility capital spending and provide definitive consumer benefit; earnings from market-facing platform activities; and transitional outcome-based performance measures." This recognizes the fact that "the traditional provider's role has evolved to a platform service that enables a multi-sided market in which buyers and sellers interact. The platform [will collect] a fee for this critical market-making service, while the bulk of the capital risk is undertaken by third parties." NY-PSC. 2016 (May 19). Case No. 14-M-0101. Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework.

services.³⁸ The need for utility performance incentives and corresponding metrics that will motivate utilities to provide data to third-party energy technology companies to compete in this space is critical to facilitating a competitive energy services space. NY REV has focused on addressing these issues by adopting a DER provider survey as part of its EAM. The NY REV DER survey is under development.

3.2.3 Renewable Energy Performance Metrics

Hawaii adopted performance metrics to require utilities to reveal all renewable energy used by each utility, whether utility-based or distributed. The Hawaii guiding goals and directional incentives identified for refinement and further consideration include system renewable energy (excluding customer-sited generation), total renewable energy generated (including DG), renewable energy curtailments, and compliance with renewable portfolio standards. These metrics are to be posted on the utilities' websites to facilitate customer access and private market decision-making and planning.³⁹

In March 2015, Hawaii further ordered development of metrics, a website, and a review process for renewable metrics. The Hawaii Public Utilities Commission ordered the utilities to "regularly report, maintain, and promptly periodically update the [renewable energy] performance metrics," and to "participate in an iterative metrics and website development and review process."⁴⁰ This process would establish and post to a website metrics for the following renewable energy metrics:⁴¹

1. System renewable energy metric
2. Renewable portfolio standard compliance

3. Total renewable energy metric
4. Number of net energy metering program participants and capacity of net energy metering program.
5. The development of these metrics will facilitate transparency with customers, stakeholders, and the public.

3.2.4 Operational Incentives: Improved Power Plant Performance

There is a history of California regulators developing system operational incentives when its utilities were vertically integrated in the late 1980s and 1990s. During this time, nuclear plant costs were so high that nuclear plants faced the possibility of sitting idle because rates were not high enough to recover their fixed costs. As a result, in a 1998 settlement, California regulators set rates for the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant based on an avoided cost calculation. This rate was above market rates and was meant to allow the plant to operate and provide service to ratepayers. The rate was fixed and escalated only for inflation. The performance guiding goal was to achieve increased hours of generation. Under this settlement, the plant earned more than \$0.12/kWh while the western U.S. wholesale market prices dropped to roughly \$0.03/kWh. Hindsight demonstrates that the avoided cost calculation did not predict the future price. Learning from this error, California set the avoided cost for replacement power payment for the Palo Verde nuclear station at the market-based cost of replacement power. The cost of replacement power was the cost for the California utility to charge to its ratepayers for power to serve the utility's load, in this case purchased from the Palo Verde nuclear station. Subsequently, the California energy crisis occurred in the summer of 2000, and the cost of replacement power increased tenfold. The result was utility payments for nuclear power at much higher replacement power

³⁸ Elking, E. 2015. *Knowledge is Power, How Improved Energy Data Access Can Bolster Clean Energy Technologies & Save Money*. Berkeley, CA: Center for Law, Energy & the Environment Publications. <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=cleepubs>.

³⁹ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 89.

⁴⁰ Hawaii Public Utility Commission. 2014 (February 7). Docket 2013-0141. Order No. 31098. <https://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/DocketSearch>.

⁴¹ Hawaii Public Utility Commission. 2014 (February 7). Docket 2013-0141. Order No. 31098. <https://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/DocketSearch>.

costs than were anticipated.⁴² Both mechanisms were subsequently modified because of a perception that the utility was overcompensated for the cost of nuclear generation.

Both these California mechanisms were pricing mechanisms intended to incentivize acquisition of low-cost power through pricing of power purchases depending on formulas that did not anticipate future energy market prices adequately. To the extent the pricing formulas were intended to incent purchases from these nuclear power plants, they succeeded. However, to the extent the formulas were intended to save ratepayers money, the pricing failed to incorporate mechanisms that ensured ratepayer savings would occur.

Moving forward two decades, there is perhaps an appreciation for testing PBR and metrics first before adopting full-fledged and potentially expensive performance incentives. In 2014, Hawaii adopted performance metrics for generator performance. These include equivalent availability factor, equivalent forced outage rate demand, and equivalent forced outage factor. These metrics were ordered to be posted on the utilities' websites to facilitate stakeholder and customer access.⁴³ As noted in Section 5.2, while reporting obligations for certain performance criteria or metrics are a weak form of PBR, they are PBR nonetheless. The requirement that utilities track, analyze, and report specific information can affect utility behavior and may be precedent to establishing incentives.⁴⁴

3.2.5 Operational Incentives: Improved Interconnection Request Response Times

Performance-based metrics have been used to incentivize utilities to improve interconnection request response times for DERs. How these mechanisms are structured varies widely by jurisdiction. The Illinois Commerce Commission approved a settlement in 2013 that requires a performance metric to be developed by Commonwealth Edison to track time to connect DERs to the grid.⁴⁵ These include reporting on Commonwealth Edison's response time to DER project applications and time from receipt of an application until energy flows from the project to the distribution grid. A similarly structured metric was implemented for connections to the transmission grid where a generation project would connect at a higher transmission voltage.⁴⁶ These are report-only metrics with no corresponding incentives or penalties.

In its Track 2 Order in 2016, the NY-PSC directed the electric utilities to propose a DER interconnection survey process and associated EAM metrics. The utilities filed these in September 2016. The NY-PSC, in March 2017, issued an order that determined that the utilities' proposed frameworks for the DG interconnection surveys and performance metrics did not fully address the need for improved interconnection processes, and required the utilities to submit a revised filing. Specifically, the NY-PSC found:⁴⁷

⁴² Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, pp. 53, 63–69.

⁴³ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 89.

⁴⁴ Before 2014, Hawaii had an Energy Cost Adjustment Clause with a heat rate efficiency factor. This clause encouraged dispatch of the most efficient power plants with the lowest heat-rate (i.e., the most thermal energy generated per unit of fuel input). However, concerns were raised that the heat rate target would penalize utilities for integrating higher levels of renewables that might impose higher ramping requirements and lower capacity factors for thermal power plants balancing renewable loads, both of which would negatively impact thermal unit heat rates. To address this disincentive for renewable integration, a "deadband" of +/- 50 Btu/kWh sales was added to the heat rate target. A deadband is a zone of no adjustment around a specific performance criteria or metric; in this case, the deadband is expressed as a metric around the allowed heat rate so the utility would not lose the benefits of the heat rate efficiency factor if ramping to accommodate renewable resources increased or decreased the heat rate within a range of 50 Btu/kWh. A deadband thus provides a range where utility revenue is not affected by variation in the metric. Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 94.

⁴⁵ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 85.

⁴⁶ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 85.

⁴⁷ NY-PSC. 2017 (March 9). Case 14-M-0101. Order Directing Modifications to the Joint Utilities Proposed Interconnection Earning Adjustment Mechanism Framework. <http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA007DCFE2?OpenDocument>

- The survey metric will use survey results of DG applicants with projects greater than 50 kW and up to 5 MW.⁴⁸ Each utility target will be considered in individual utility proceedings. Each utility is required to have a collaborative process to obtain input from stakeholders (including DG applicants and developers) on the appropriate target, and the process must reflect the collaborative discussions and provide the basis for the target proposed.
- Regarding the survey to assess satisfaction with the interconnection process, utilities are required to survey DER interconnection applicants when the applicants have received preliminary review from the utility (a mid-point survey), and another survey once the DER application is complete. The surveys are to be phone, web-based, or both. The survey design and vetting process will be thorough. The survey questions must be vetted through cognitive (how respondents understand the questions and respond) and field testing (to assess responses on survey questions). Finally, these surveys will include a core sequence of questions applicable to all utilities, which will be used to determine the utilities' eligibility for the EAM.
- Failed applications will not be part of the EAM evaluation criteria. However, utilities must collect data on failed applications for a separate purpose.
- The DG interconnection EAM value will generally be consistent across utilities. Each utility is required to have a collaborative process to obtain input from stakeholders on the appropriate value.

Consolidated Edison (Con Edison) received approval for an interconnection EAM in January 2017 as part of a rate case.⁴⁹ The interconnection EAM covers DG projects between 50 kW and 5 MW, and it measures results against three targets:

- Standardized interconnection requirements timeliness; these requirements include specific timelines by which interconnection projects must be approved.

- A survey of customer satisfaction conducted by an independent surveyor
- An audit of failed applications conducted by an independent auditor.

Con Edison will convene a collaborative⁵⁰ to seek agreement on the targets for the three EAM measures and other details. Although targets will be established and data will be collected in 2017, there will be no earning opportunity for Rate Year One. The earning opportunity for Rate Year Two and Rate Year Three will be five basis points (0.05% of ROE; Con Edison's ROE is 9%) in each rate year.

The NY-PSC also has a separate EAM specifically for DER deployments.

3.2.6 Operational Incentives: Differing Approaches to Achieving System Efficiency

Operational metrics can and often do focus on achieving system efficiencies. Jurisdictions identify system efficiency differently based on their particular needs, configurations, and priorities, with some focused on load factor improvement and peak reduction and others focused more broadly on reducing system losses, including theft and administrative and operational efficiency.

3.2.6.1 Denmark

The Danish transmission system operator, Energinet.dk, a state-owned, not-for-profit utility, is subject to non-profit "cost plus" regulation. Energinet.dk is not allowed to build up equity or pay dividends to its owner (Danish Ministry of Energy) and can only recover "necessary costs" by efficient operations and a "necessary return on capital." Revenues are therefore set to recover the necessary costs of efficient operation plus a modest interest on equity capital. The regulator, Energitilsynet (also known as DERA) can refuse

⁴⁸ The NY-PSC declined to apply an EAM to applications for projects less than 50 kW.

⁴⁹ NY-PSC 2017 (January 25). Case 16-E-0060, Case 16-G-0061, Case 16-E-0196. Order Approving Electric and Gas Rate Plans (for Con Edison).

⁵⁰ A collaborative is a stakeholder process that seeks input on various aspects of commission proceedings. They have historically been used in energy efficiency. For more information, see Li, M., and Bryson, J. 2015. *Energy Efficiency Collaboratives*. State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network. <https://www4.eere.energy.gov/seeaction/system/files/documents/EECollaboratives-0925final.pdf>

the recovery of non-efficiently incurred costs. The guiding principle or goal is efficient operations.

The goal of the Danish net volume efficiency model is to encourage the most inefficient distribution system operators (DSOs) to become as efficient as the top 10% of DSOs within a four-year period. The main feature of the model, which is applied annually, is a cost index measuring the costs of an average DSO running a particular grid. Thus, the metric is the cost index measure, a benchmarking measure. The model allows individual DSO performance to be compared with its peers' performance despite differences in size and characteristics of specific grids. By limiting the number of cost elements analyzed to 23, the Danish benchmarking methodology, the "netvolumen" methodology, achieves an acceptable balance between efficiency benchmarking accuracy and the necessary resource requirements from the regulator (DERA) needed to accomplish this.⁵¹ The benchmarking attempts to account for utility size and service territories; the net volume and quality of supply models are designed to take account of dissimilarities between DSOs' size and the nature of their grids. However, there is little or no identification of areas in the economic benchmarking (the netvolumen model) where the DSO excels or performs particularly well. The measured outcome of the net volume model is an efficiency index comparing the actual cost incurred by a DSO in operating its grid with the costs incurred by an "average" DSO.

3.2.6.2 New York, United States

A recent NY REV Order mandates EAMs related to peak reduction and load improvement factor by which:

1. Each utility must propose a peak reduction target and a load factor improvement target. Each utility proposal for this EAM will meet a list of requirements including targets, an analysis based on a benefit-cost analysis framework, and a proposed financial incentive for

economic savings. These may include complementary strategies to build electric load, improve load factor, and reduce carbon emissions, such as encouraging conversion to EVs, geothermal heat pumps, or other efficient and beneficial uses.

2. Utilities must propose targets for peak reduction and load factor improvement over a period of five years. Individual utility targets may be either annual or cumulative with milestones. Peak reduction targets are required to establish either a specific MW objective for system peak or a percentage reduction from a defined MW amount. Both peak reduction and load factor improvement targets are required to be ambitious in size to encourage a portfolio approach beyond conventional programs. Targets and awards are to be established on a graduated basis that encompasses both moderate levels of achievement and superior results. Only positive earnings adjustments will be used for these initial EAMs, with the size of the adjustment graduated to the extent of achievement. To demonstrate achievement under this EAM, NY-PSC will examine the contribution of each component of the program, to avoid any incentive to achieve by reducing economic activity. This EAM is still under development.

New York is attempting to achieve a more efficient utility electrical grid by improving the load factor and reducing peak demand so electricity usage is more smoothly spread across different times of the day. The idea behind this improved load factor EAM is that capital infrastructure is used more efficiently if the infrastructure is used for more hours than just the peak periods. Implementing these concepts in January 2017, the NY-PSC approved a rate case for Con Edison that included a system efficiency EAM.⁵² This EAM includes three metrics:

- **Incremental System Peak Reduction:** Targets have already been set for this metric.

⁵¹ In the netvolumen model, each DSO has annually reported its stock of 23 types of grid component. DERA obtains a measure of the DSO's net volume by multiplying the stock of each component by an estimated cost parameter including both operational cost and depreciation. The net volume effectively measures the cost that an "average" DSO would incur in operating each DSO's distribution network. Comparing this figure with the DSO's actual cost gives a cost-index for each DSO. This allows DERA to rank all DSOs in terms of operational efficiency and apply an annual efficiency factor to each DSO, in order to lift efficiency to that of the top 10% of DSOs within four years.

⁵² NY-PSC. 2017 (January 25). Case 16-E-0060, Case 16-G-0061, Case 16-E-0196. Order Approving Electric and Gas Rate Plans (for Con Edison).

- **Customer Load Factor:** Con Edison will be further analyzing factors related to this EAM and proposing a metric for it in Rate Year Two.
- **DER Utilization:** The DERs falling under this metric for Rate Year One are solar PVs, combined heat and power, fuel cells, battery storage, demand response, thermal storage, heat pumps, and EV charging. DERs will be measured in terms of the annualized MWh produced, consumed, discharged, or reduced from incremental resources. Because not all DERs are individually metered or measured, MWh produced or consumed by incremental DERs will be determined on an annualized basis using fixed assumptions.

The maximum earning opportunity for these system efficiency metrics in Rate Year One is four basis points, which is 0.04% of ROE, which would be added to Con Edison's ROE of 9%.

In January 2017, the NY-PSC approved a rate case for Con Edison that included several EAMs, including two energy efficiency metrics.⁵³ The first energy efficiency metric is for meeting or exceeding target levels for incremental gigawatt-hour savings. Energy efficiency incentives are not a new application of PBR. However, the second metric, developed through a collaborative process, is an energy intensity metric for both the residential and commercial sectors. It is intended to incentivize efforts to decrease energy intensity beyond recent system trajectories (including energy savings from existing programs). Con Edison will earn this incentive if the decline in energy intensity improves beyond the trend in 2010. The performance targets will be set on a rate class basis for residential kWh

per customer and commercial kWh per employee at the end of Rate Year One at a declining intensity trajectory.⁵⁴ Con Edison can earn a maximum of 7.76 basis points in Rate Year One under this mechanism.

3.2.6.3 Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is focusing on improving system efficiency by mandating performance metrics within its integrated resource planning (IRP) process. The Legislative Assembly of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico enacted Act 57-2014,⁵⁵ which mandated performance metrics be adopted as part of the IRP process.⁵⁶ As the Legislative Assembly described it, "(w)e have been held as hostages of a poorly efficient energy system that excessively depends on oil as a fuel, and that does not provide the tools to promote our Island as a place of opportunities in the global market."⁵⁷ Thus, it is in this context that the Puerto Rico Energy Commission (PREC) established performance metrics in the first set of IRP rules. Because of the significance with which the PREC views the need for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) to improve its performance on all fronts, the PREC has now established a separate proceeding to revisit and revise those metrics.⁵⁸

On November 15, 2016, the PREC issued a notice of investigation that commenced the process to review performance metrics more comprehensively. The PREC has already received comments from interested stakeholders.⁵⁹ The process will incorporate three separate components: (1) a PREC investigation into PREPA's operations to assist in developing final performance metrics that will supersede the metrics set forth in the IRP rules,

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Con Edison will use averages across the rate classes for the customers and employees. The energy use will be tracked on 12-month rolling weather-normalized monthly energy sales.

⁵⁵ Puerto Rico Energy Transformation and RELIEF Act, as amended. This legislation created a regulatory commission, the Puerto Rico Energy Commission, and included numerous regulatory provisions, including an IRP and a timeframe (one year) for the utility, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, to file.

⁵⁶ Act 57, §6C(h)(iv). Specifically, the law sets out detailed parameters that include revenue per kWh; operating and maintenance expenses per kWh; operating and maintenance expenses of the distribution system per customer; customer service expenses per customer; general and administrative expenses per customer; energy sustainability; emissions; total amount of energy used annually in Puerto Rico; total amount of energy used annually per capita, for Puerto Rico as a whole and separately for urban and non-urban areas; and total energy cost per capita, for Puerto Rico as a whole and separately for urban and non-urban areas.

⁵⁷ Act 57, §6C(h)(iv), Statement of Motives.

⁵⁸ Puerto Rico Energy Commission Order 8594, May 2015, IRP Rule, Article V.

⁵⁹ Puerto Rico Energy Commission. 2016 (November 15). In re: The Performance of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, Case No. CEPR-IN-2016-0002.

Table 2. Draft Performance Metrics by Area^a

Area	Metric	Unit of Measure	Target
Overall system	CAIDI (customer average interruption duration index)	Minutes	146
Generation	Plant availability (system)	Percentage	76%
Transmission and distribution (T&D)	SAIDI (system average interruption duration index) (system)	Minutes	48
T&D	SAIFI (system average interruption frequency index) (system)	Percentage	0.328%
Finance	Accounts payable days outstanding	Days	35
Planning and environmental	Timeliness of response to regulatory requests	Percentage	95%
Operations (purchasing)	Contracts as percent of spending	Percentage	80%
Operations (fleet)	Fleet out of service (system)	Percentage	20.5%

^a Puerto Rico Energy Commission. 2017 (April 27). In re: The Performance of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority. Performance Metrics. Case No. CEPR-IN-2016-0002. <http://energia.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Resolution-Performance-Metrics-CEPR-IN-2016-0002.pdf>

(2) an independent engineering assessment of PREPA's operations focusing on the reliability and integrity of the entire transmission, distribution, and generating system, especially in light of the extensive outage in September 2016, and (3) rulemaking to create the new amended metrics. One of the challenges, however, is that PREPA is a state-owned entity, making assessment of rewards or penalties challenging.

A subsequent order seeking comment from PREPA and interested stakeholders was issued on April 27, 2017.⁶⁰ In it, performance metrics were identified and listed under the following categories: overall system, generation, transmission, and distribution, customer service, finance, planning, environmental, operations, information technology, human resources, legal, renewable energy, and demand-side management. Each category has an identified list of potential metrics for which the PREC is seeking comment

before drafting proposed rules. The operational metrics focus on efficiency in purchasing, warehousing, fleet, and fuel, and are designed to improve tracking, reporting, and efficiency in these categories as a means to cut costs and eliminate waste. Reporting requirements in other areas such as demand-side management, which measures reductions in peak and energy usage, will also affect system efficiency. Because of the lack of accountability for PREPA before being regulated, most of the metrics are focused on reporting information to create a baseline from which to measure progress as new internal processes to improve performance are implemented. Thereafter, as part of the rulemaking, metrics may be put in place that would require progress on each metric reported. This proceeding is in the nascent stage of development as the PREC considers the best course of action. Table 2 presents draft performance metrics used in Puerto Rico.

⁶⁰ Puerto Rico Energy Commission. 2017 (April 27). In re: The Performance of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority. Performance Metrics. Case No. CEPR-IN-2016-0002. <http://energia.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Resolution-Performance-Metrics-CEPR-IN-2016-0002.pdf>.

3.2.7 Operational Efficiency: Financial Solvency Linked to Efficiency Improvement

Where state-owned enterprises have been operating inefficiently for years and they need financial support because costs exceed revenue, it is possible to link continued state support to improving the efficiency of operations. A PBR mechanism being implemented in India uses financial incentives to achieve dual objectives: (1) increase the financial stability of distribution companies (DISCOMs) in India and (2) increase energy efficiency.

Most distribution utilities in India are wholly owned by their respective state governments, even though they have been regulated by independent regulators over the last 15 or more years. Different states unbundled their state-owned utilities differently and created the regulatory system at different points in time. The state governments own and operate their own DISCOMs, with little national government oversight. For political reasons, the states have provided inexpensive electricity at far less than the actual cost of supply and delivery. As a result, for many decades, the state government-owned DISCOMs have been incurring heavy losses—totaling losses of approximately Rs. 3.8 lakh crore (~\$59.28 billion) and outstanding debt of approximately Rs. 4.3 lakh crore (~\$67 billion) as of March 2015—because of average tariffs not keeping up with increasing costs, technical losses, theft, and limited bill recovery.

Financially stressed DISCOMs are unable to supply adequate power at affordable rates, which hampers quality of life and overall economic growth and development. Efforts toward 100% village electrification, “24/7” power supply, and ambitious clean energy targets are very unlikely to

be achieved without financially solvent DISCOMs that can provide continuous power. Power outages also adversely affect nation-building initiatives that depend on facilities having reliable electricity. In addition, defaults on bank loans by financially distressed DISCOMs have the potential to seriously impact the banking sector and the economy at large.⁶¹

The Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY) is a PIM that was approved by the Union Cabinet of the Indian Government in 2015. It is a scheme that is designed to facilitate the financial and operational turnaround of Indian DISCOMs. UDAY is active in 22 Indian states, and involves an agreement among the federal government, each state government, and the utility to achieve targets regarding utility financial stability, decreased power losses, improved end-use energy efficiency (especially in the agricultural sector), meeting renewable energy targets, and other goals that are relevant to that state.

UDAY operates through four initiatives aimed at (1) improving operational efficiencies of DISCOMs, (2) reducing the cost of power, (3) reducing the interest cost of DISCOMs, and (4) enforcing financial discipline on DISCOMs through alignment with state finances. Operational efficiency improvements (e.g., compulsory smart metering, upgradation of transformers, meters, and other network infrastructure) and implementation of energy efficiency measures (e.g., efficient LED bulbs, agricultural pumps, fans, and air conditioners) aim to reduce the average aggregate technical and commercial (AT&C) loss from approximately 22% to 15% and eliminate the gap between the average revenue realized and the average cost of supply by 2018–2019.⁶²

⁶¹ Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 2015 (November 5). “UDAY (Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana) for Financial Turnaround of Power Distribution Companies.” <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=130261>.

⁶² AT&C losses refer to a combination of technical losses and commercial losses. Technical losses are unavoidable losses owing to flow of power in transmission and distribution (T&D) systems that are the result of network design, specifications of the equipment used in the network, and network operation parameters. Commercial losses are avoidable to some extent and arise because of operational loopholes. They are a result of theft, metering issues, inefficient billing procedures, inadequate revenue collection, and non-remunerative tariff structure and subsidies.

$\% \text{ AT\&C} = \{ 1 - \text{Billing Efficiency} \times \text{Collection Efficiency} \} \times 100.$

where:

Billing Efficiency: Total Billed Unit (kWh) / Total Input Energy (kWh) relative to the distribution asset
Collection Efficiency: Total Collected amount / Total Billed Amount

UDAY recognizes the importance of aligning the goals of the central government, the state governments, and the DISCOMs. To that end, it provides customized guiding goals and directional incentives for each DISCOM in exchange for a financial support package.⁶³ In return for the bailout, the DISCOMs have been given target dates (from 2017 to 2019) by which they must meet certain efficiency parameters, such as reduction in power lost through transmission, theft and faulty metering, installing smart meters, and implementing geographic information system mapping of areas with high losses. States will also have to ensure that power tariffs are revised regularly so that the DISCOMs receive enough revenue to cover costs. The central government allows this additional debt on the state government books to not be counted against their fiscal obligations, and it will provide support for DISCOMs through its own schemes (e.g., rural electrification and network upgradation). The DISCOMs will also need to adopt certain tariff revisions, as prior tariffs were too low to compensate the utility for the actual cost of service, and tariffs were to be revised to reflect the actual costs. It is unclear whether the new tariffs do this, or whether they can be enforced on consumers.⁶⁴ Consequences for noncompliance are unclear.

Reductions in the cost of power are being achieved through measures such as increased supply of less-expensive domestic coal, sourcing coal from more efficient plants, coal price rationalization based on gross calorific value, supply of washed and crushed coal, and faster completion of transmission lines.

UDAY represents an innovative way to address larger systemic challenges of financial instability of utilities owned and operated by subnational governments. The innovative part of this scheme is that it recognizes and directly

confronts the fact that financial liabilities of DISCOMs are the contingent liabilities of the respective states and need to be recognized as such. Debt of DISCOMs is de facto borrowing by states, which is not counted in de jure borrowing. However, credit rating agencies and multilateral agencies are conscious of this de facto debt in their appraisals.

To date UDAY has been well received by the states that have signed up for it.⁶⁵ This is encouraging, as the states are key stakeholders to the success of UDAY. Figure 2 shows the quarterly rankings for state/DISCOM performance publicized on the UDAY national dashboard, which encourages state and DISCOM good performance.




Figure 2. UDAY state/DISCOM quarterly performance ranking
Government of India, Ministry of Power. 2017. UDAY National Dashboard.
<https://www.uday.gov.in/home.php>.

⁶³ Under the scheme, the state governments will take over three-fourths of the debt of their respective DISCOMs. The state governments will then issue "UDAY bonds" to banks and other financial institutions to raise money to pay off the banks. The remaining 25% of the DISCOM debt will be addressed in one of two ways: conversion into lower interest rate loans by the lending banks or by issuance of DISCOM bonds backed by state government guarantee (which helps bring down interest rates). Madhu, M. 2016 (March 28). "All You Wanted to Know About UDAY." *The Hindu Business Line*. <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/all-you-wanted-to-know-about-uday/article8406121.ece>

⁶⁴ Currently, 17 out of the 22 states have reported AT&C losses for this year, and the total losses across all 17 states are 22.49%. The goal is for each state to have 15% AT&C losses or less. Government of India, Ministry of Power. (undated). UDAY National Dashboard. https://www.uday.gov.in/atc_india.php. Additionally, tariff revisions were required as part of the memorandum of understanding for each state, as the utility needs state buy-in to accomplish these tariff revisions. Tariff revisions have been filed in 19 of 22 states. In this respect, the memoranda have been successful. Government of India, Ministry of Power. (undated). UDAY National Dashboard. https://www.uday.gov.in/atc_india.php.

⁶⁵ Adebare, A. 2016 (January 25). "India: A Closer Look at the Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana Uday Scheme." *Mondaq*. <http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/460820/Oil+Gas+Electricity/A+Closer+Look+At+The+Ujwal+Discom+Assurance+Yojana+Uday+Scheme>.

3.2.8 Operational Metrics: Reliability

As part of a grid modernization initiative, the Illinois Commerce Commission adopted PBR formula rate tariffs.⁶⁶ These tariffs were approved under Illinois' Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act, which authorized \$3.2 billion in grid hardening and smart meter investments. The guiding principle of the act and tariff is to achieve increased grid reliability and operational efficiency by offering the utilities increased certainty about capital investments such as distribution reclosers, substation improvements, pole reinforcements, undergrounding targeted lines, and vegetation management.⁶⁷

This Illinois tariff approved formula rates for participating utilities, thus providing greater utility confidence that grid modernization expenses would be found prudent with a set rate of return to be adjusted annually based on known factors. In exchange for this formula rate treatment, participating utilities are required to file multi-year metrics with the Illinois Commerce Commission to improve performance over a ten-year period, including reliability performance.

After installing grid automation and more intelligent sensors, and after making the range of approved grid hardening and smart grid investments described earlier, the utilities reported improvements in outage frequency and duration.⁶⁸ But the utilities have failed to meet the 75% improvement performance criteria set by the Illinois Commerce Commission and have been penalized with a five-basis-point reduction in authorized ROE as a result. This reduction of ROE resulted in an approximate \$2 million reduction in Commonwealth Edison's roughly \$2.5 billion annual revenue requirement.⁶⁹ This is a negative incentive

scheme that imposes a low penalty reduction in an approved formula rate when reliability criteria are not met.

Setting reliability goals, performance criteria, or metrics can be difficult. It is important not to fall into the "no-amount-of-reliability-is-enough" trap, because reliability investments are limitless. The amount of reliability that regulators should require and how to measure it are perennial utility questions: how much reliability should be required, or, another way to ask the question is, how much reliability in their electric service do customers want to pay for? The Canadian province of Alberta recognized this quandary squarely in its decision rejecting a reward-based PIM for exceeding expected reliability standards:

... in a competitive market, a company may increase its service quality and charge a higher price, but risks losing customers. For monopoly utility companies, there is no risk of losing customers. Customers have no choice but to pay the higher price of service quality levels that they may not want or cannot afford.⁷⁰

Norwegian regulators approached the reliability quandary by asking utility customers how much they value reliability using customer surveys to construct a willingness-to-pay curve for different levels of system reliability. They then used a PBR scheme to have their utilities internalize the reliability valuation by customers. Norway uses revenue cap regulation to control utility costs. It allows utilities to retain cost savings from operating below approved costs. Because revenue cap regulation can create an incentive to cut costs in ways that impact system reliability, this system adjusts utility revenues each year based on the costs of outages to customers. Thus, if outages increase, utility revenue is reduced. Or, if outages are reduced below a baseline level, the utility receives higher revenues the next year.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Illinois Compiled Statutes. Infrastructure investment and modernization; regulatory reform. 220 ILCS 5/16-108.5. 2017.

⁶⁷ McCabe, A., Ghoshal, O. and Peters, B. 2016 (May). "A Formula for Grid Modernization?" *Public Utilities Fortnightly*. <https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2016/05/formula-grid-modernization>.

⁶⁸ Both utilities, Ameren and Commonwealth Edison, report reliability improvements. See Ameren Illinois. 2015 (June 1). *Modernization Action Plan*. <https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/edocket/406271.pdf>; Commonwealth Edison. 2015 (April). *Multi-Year Performance Metrics*. <https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/edocket/402546.pdf>.

⁶⁹ McCabe, A., Ghoshal, O., and Peters, B. 2016 (May). "A Formula for Grid Modernization?" *Public Utilities Fortnightly*. <https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2016/05/formula-grid-modernization>.

⁷⁰ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A.. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 41.

⁷¹ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A.. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 35.

Under this system, a Norwegian utility seeking to maximize profits will increase expenditures to the point where the marginal cost of increased reliability equals the customers' willingness to pay (as shown in the customer surveys). The Norwegian reliability PBR is designed to achieve the optimal level of reliability. The optimal reliability level is where marginal utility costs equal the marginal customer benefits determined in the customer surveys. Use of the survey instrument to determine the optimal level of reliability and then motivating the utility with positive and negative incentives is a particularly innovative approach to implementing reliability goals.

3.2.9 Modified Fuel Adjustment Clauses to Address Higher Ramping Rates for Integration of Renewables

Fuel adjustment clauses are common to allow utilities to pass through costs of fuel, which can move up and down between rate cases because of market fluctuations. However, these clauses can provide a disincentive for efficient generator management because they remove utility risk in achieving efficient power production from fuels when the fuel cost is subject to 100% pass-through to customers, and thus saving fuel does not benefit the utility. Once this was recognized, conditioning cost recovery on certain power plant efficiency levels, or adapting shared savings mechanisms, has become more common. Experience with these modified fuel adjustment mechanisms, in which the utility bears some risk for fuel cost overruns and can keep some savings from efficient operations, suggests such clauses do indeed encourage operational efficiencies. One study concluded the modified fuel adjustment clauses resulted in 9% more output per given inputs than utilities with a 100% pass-through mechanism of all fuel costs.⁷²

This experience with the incentive structure of fuel adjustment clauses and modifications is mentioned here because it demonstrates that operational efficiency

requirements do work in practice when carefully designed. Moreover, this demonstrates how various aspects of the utility business work in tandem, and that PBR must be iterated as new impacts are discovered. One such unintended consequence was a penalty for fuel-units that ramped up and down to accommodate higher renewable resources on the system. It is also informative of new challenges, such as encouraging operation and development of resources with high ramping rates, voltage support, and frequency regulation as more renewables are integrated into grid operations. Experience with modified fuel adjustment clauses suggests carefully implemented incentives to provide these advanced grid supports are achievable and will take effort and experience to perfect.

3.2.10 Performance-Based Regulatory Approaches to Promote Customer Empowerment

PBR can improve utility focus on customer satisfaction and can actively promote customer empowerment. Customer empowerment is defined here as the ability of customers to provide feedback on utility service and demand-side energy options and to see publicly reported performance data on their utility.

Under the United Kingdom's Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs (RIIO), customer satisfaction has increased significantly. This increase in satisfaction appears to some extent to be related to the published rankings of utility performance. Customers can see the satisfaction rankings and, based on these rankings or their own personal experience, are able to switch suppliers.⁷³ Figure 3 shows the customer satisfaction ranking.

Likewise, Denmark annually reviews its utilities' performance with its benchmarking scheme. The outcome of the benchmarking processes, in terms of efficiencies made and reductions in allowed DSO revenues, is reported in the DERA annual report to share the efficiency findings

⁷² Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A.. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf

⁷³ Osborne, H. 2017 (February 27). "Energy Bills: Are UK Customers Finally Starting to Switch Supplier?" *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/feb/27/energy-bills-more-uk-customers-are-moving-supplier-figures-show>.




Figure 3. Customer satisfaction in the United Kingdom

Ofgem. 2016. "Customer Satisfaction: Six Large Electricity Suppliers." <https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/chart/customer-satisfaction-six-large-electricity-suppliers>.

with the public. In Denmark, as with many other EU member states, customers can switch their supplier (energy retailer) but cannot switch their DSO. Customers are not therefore empowered in that they cannot exercise choice in terms of their DSO. However, the benchmarking scheme does to some extent compensate for this lock-in by giving customers some comfort that their DSO is required to strive to become as efficient as the best 10% of the DSO community. The Danish annual report is a less pronounced effort than RIIO's, but it is directionally similar in that it endeavors to provide utility performance data on compliance with regulatory benchmarking.⁷⁴

Puerto Rico has included customer service among its many categories of metrics. In its IRP proceeding, Puerto Rico adopted operation metrics for customer satisfaction, system efficiency, and system operations as follows:

- Number of formal and informal customer complaints, including response time to resolve

complaints and a short description of the complaint and how it was resolved

- Response time to service requests and outages
- Residential customer satisfaction, based on a survey of residential customers conducted by an independent entity with expertise in conducting customer surveys
- Business customer satisfaction, based on a survey of business customers conducted by an independent entity with expertise in conducting customer surveys.

Another form of customer empowerment is to expand on past customer satisfaction metrics to show expanded measures of customer satisfaction. The PREC also focused in its recent PBR decision on customer empowerment through a series of metrics related to customer choice to make customer-sited energy management decisions. The PREC promulgated the metrics in Table 3 related to customer empowerment.

⁷⁴ The DERA annual report provides efficiency data for the DSO community as a whole and is therefore "directionally similar" to Ofgem's RIIO annual report; however, the latter and its associated documents provide far more detailed information for each individual DSO. The number of DSOs involved is one reason DERA may report on a DSO community basis.

⁷⁵ PREC. 2015. Regulation on Integrated Resource Plan for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority. Order 8594, Article V. Other topics include reliability, system costs, and environmental goals.

Table 3. Puerto Rico Metrics for Customer Empowerment

Metric	Description
Energy efficiency	Number and percent of customers served by programs, annual and lifetime energy savings, levelized program costs per lifetime energy saved
Demand response	Number and percent of customers served by programs, annual and lifetime demand savings, levelized program costs per MW saved
Distributed generation	Number of installations per year and cumulative, capacity (MW) of installations per year and cumulative
Energy storage	Number of installations per year and cumulative, capacity (MW) of installations per year and cumulative
Electric vehicles	Number of installations per year and cumulative, capacity (MW) of installations per year and cumulative
Information availability	Number of customers able to access hourly usage
Time-varying rates	Number of customers on time-varying rates ⁷⁵

The relationships that the PREC perceives between customer satisfaction, efficiency, and system operations are consistent with 21st century regulatory approaches that link customer satisfaction with the measure of system efficiency.

Scorecards—with clear metrics and mandated formats approved by regulatory authorities and designed with broad utility and stakeholder input—may become a hallmark of 21st century power sector regulation. Taking a page from RIIO's success with increased customer satisfaction, the NY-PSC will require utility scorecards for simplified reporting to ratepayers and the public under NY REV. Development of these scorecards is underway, and performance criteria and metrics are likely to be settled in 2018. The NY-PSC ordered the parties of the NY REV proceeding to undertake a collaborative effort to specify metrics that should be maintained as scorecards to measure desired outcomes, although scorecards would not have any direct impact on regulated earnings. The following scorecard categories are to be used initially, and they are still being defined and developed; other categories may be explored in the future.

- System utilization and efficiency
- DER penetration

- Time-of-use rate efficacy
- Market development
- Market-based revenues
- Carbon reduction
- Conversion of fossil-fueled end-uses
- Customer satisfaction
- Customer enhancement (includes affordability)
- Affordability
- Resilience.

3.2.11 PBR Approaches to Support Competition

Energy service companies, including DER providers, in partnership with new advanced technology companies, are offering services, including energy efficiency, distributed generation, smart energy management systems, and energy storage to small customers that were previously only available to larger customers. Some services and products can compete directly with utility offerings and reduce the need for utility services. Utilities thus may perceive a competitive risk and make interconnection or

provision of some services difficult. To address anticompetitive utility behavior, certain metrics can encourage utility cooperation to deliver required services. These metrics include system interconnection application processing time and the number of DERs on the system. New York is moving forward with DER provider surveys to assess utility performance in multiple DER-provider/utility interactions, as well as utility compliance with interconnection application timeframes (see Section 7.2.1). Care can also be taken to ensure incentives are evenhanded for utilities and other DER providers. The U.K. regulatory authority, Ofgem, strives to ensure that any incentive benefit available to utilities is also available to independent providers when competition exists for a particular service, such as connection services.⁷⁶

Incentives can also work in a contrary direction: to free up utilities to respond to mounting competition. Multi-year rate plans are often adopted to allow utilities more flexibility in marketing when faced with competition and to allow superior utility performance to earn superior returns over a multiple-year period. Of course, multi-year plans could encourage anticompetitive behavior as well, if not addressed through other mechanisms such as those discussed here.

3.2.12 Peak Load Reduction Enabled by Demand Response

Peak load reduction represents a key cost-avoidance opportunity for systems with growing generation, transmission, and distribution peaks. If peak load reduction is a policy goal that the jurisdiction seeks to implement, a PBR mechanism that rewards the utility for reducing peak load by a specified means can be designed and implemented. There are many strategies and measures to reduce peak load. One is the use of demand response addressed here.

Another is deployment of DERs to reduce peak among other goals for DER deployment addressed earlier. A third is as a peak reduction system efficiency measure, such as was pursued under NY REV (see Section 3.2.1.1).

A regulatory decision reached in Illinois in 2013 required Commonwealth Edison to develop a performance metric to reduce peak load through demand response. This involves load impact reductions measured in MW of peak load reduction from the summer peak owing to smart meter-enabled demand response programs administered by the utility.⁷⁷ Although these performance metrics do not include any rewards or penalties, they provide valuable information for regulators and stakeholders to monitor whether customers are receiving the full benefit of the multi-billion-dollar smart grid infrastructure investment. In addition, these metrics provide valuable information going forward for regulators if it is determined that a financial reward or penalty is warranted.⁷⁸

3.2.13 Customers Enrolled in Time-Varying Rates

Sending an accurate price signal to customers has been an issue in many jurisdictions. Because system costs vary considerably by time of day and by season for both generating and delivering electricity, the theory is that customers will make more efficient decisions for themselves and the system if they see the relative scarcity or abundance of electricity service reflected in their price. Customers would for instance see that they can save money by running a large appliance on the weekend rather than during the week. However, customers can only adjust their use to reflect pricing and scarcity if the customer's price accurately reflects the higher cost structure of the generators as well as utility plant during peak hours.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A.. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 72.

⁷⁷ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A.. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, pp. 85–86.

⁷⁸ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A.. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, pp. 85–86.

⁷⁹ It is fairly common for electricity to be priced by peak-hours/intervals where there are wholesale markets for electricity, but pricing utility T&D rates by peak usage (to capture demand on the T&D system) has historically been accomplished with demand charges for larger customers. Now with advanced metering infrastructure, T&D pricing can be done for all customers to approximate demand on the system on intervals as well.

For example, a regulatory decision reached in Illinois in 2013 requires Commonwealth Edison to develop at least four performance metrics to track customers enrolled in time-varying rates:⁸⁰

1. Number of residential customers on the utility tariff with time-variant or dynamic pricing in each delivery class and reported as a percentage of customers taking supply from that retail supplier with both numbers and percentage by rate class.
2. Number of residential customers serviced by retail suppliers who have requested monthly data interchange for interval data (meaning the customer's accounts will be set up for monthly data transfer of interval usage data) and reported as a percentage of customers taking supply from that retail supplier with both numbers and percentage by rate class.
3. The same metric as the first metric but for small commercial customers.
4. The same metric as the second metric but for small commercial customers.⁸¹

The Illinois reporting metrics illustrate significant interest from Illinois in ensuring customers have accurate pricing signals. Other jurisdictions share this interest as well. For example, Puerto Rico wants its utilities to adopt information availability practices by reporting on the number of customers able to access hourly usage data and the number of customers on time-varying rates.⁸²

3.2.14 PBRs for Smart Meter Deployment⁸³

European law requires the “implementation of intelligent metering systems that shall assist the active participation of consumers in the electricity supply market.” France has incorporated this requirement into law and code. In response, the Commission de régulation de l'énergie

proposed a smart-grid roll-out for Électricité Réseau Distribution France (ERDF), one of the distribution system operators in France. The objective of ERDF's project for its low-voltage smart metering system (≤ 36 kVA) is to deploy 35 million smart meters between the last quarter of 2015 and the end of 2021. The target deployment rate is 90% of all meters. Given the size of the project and the need to guard against any increase in costs or forecasted completion times, a specific regulatory framework has been implemented that gives ERDF incentives to control investment costs, comply with the deployment timetable, and guarantee performance of the system installed.

The PBR incentive awards ERDF a bonus of 300 basis points to be attributed to assets used in the Linky project between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2021 (excluding those used for experimental pilots and standard electronic meters). The bonus is awarded throughout the asset lifetime. It is composed of two parts:

- Part 1 (200 basis points) is calculated based on the performance of ERDF on controlling investment costs and complying with the deployment timetable (points 1 and 2 below).
- Part 2 (100 basis points) is calculated based on the performance of the smart metering system in meeting the objectives of the project and delivering a high quality of service (point 3 below).

The basis points and incentives for the three components are as follows:

1. Control investment costs.
 - a. ERDF is penalized from the first euro of additional cost because it loses the bonus of 200 basis points on this additional cost. If the additional costs exceed 5%, no further costs are remunerated (i.e., no bonus and no base-rate remuneration).

⁸⁰ Puerto Rico is also looking at reporting metrics of time-of-use rates.

⁸¹ Whited, M., Woolf, T., and Napoleon, A.. 2015. *Utility Performance Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators*. Synapse Energy Economics. http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf, p. 85.

⁸² PREC. 2015. Regulation on Integrated Resource Plan for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority. Order 8594, Article V. Other topics with subtopics include reliability, system costs, and environmental goals.

⁸³ Information in this section is from Commission de régulation de l'énergie. 2014 (July 17). Decision Determining the Incentive-based Regulatory Framework for ERDF's Smart Metering System for LV ≤ 36 kVA (English translation). <http://www.cre.fr/en/documents/deliberations/decision/smart-metering-system>.

b. From the first euro saved, ERDF keeps a bonus equal in amount to the bonus as it would have been with no saving. Grid users benefit from reduced capital charges (lower depreciation and base-rate remuneration).

2. Comply with the deployment timetable.

This incentive focuses on the number of meters that are installed and able to communicate compared to the forecasted deployment timetable. Monitoring takes place regularly throughout deployment. If the forecasted deployment percentages are not achieved, penalties are generated.

To ensure that complying with the deployment timetable does not jeopardize the quality of the installation, the Commission de regulation de l'énergie has put in place a financial incentive relating to the percentage of return visits after a Linky meter is installed during the deployment. It will also monitor the percentage of complaints related to deployment.

3. Guarantee the performance level expected from the Linky metering system.

The quality of service for the Linky metering system is a key element not only in improving the functioning of the electricity market but also in realizing benefits in terms of technical intervention (estimated at €1.0 billion [2014] at current value) and meter reading (estimated at €0.7 billion [2014] at current value). These benefits are directly proportional to the performance level of the metering system. Poor performance would thus have a significant impact on the economic value of the Linky project.

In this context, the incentive-based regulation mechanism defined by the Commission de regulation de l'énergie aims to induce ERDF to reach the performance level necessary to obtain these benefits and improve the functioning of the electricity market, to the benefit of consumers. The Commission de regulation de l'énergie thus gives ERDF a bonus of 100 basis points to induce it to maintain a performance level for the metering system that meets expectations over the long term. Conversely, any shortcoming in performance will reduce this bonus.

If the expected performance rates are not reached, penalties are assessed. The metrics prompting penalties are based on poor performance for the following:

- Percentage of successful remote meter readings by day
- Percentage of actual monthly readings published by Ginko⁴
- Percentage availability of customer internet portal
- Percentage of Linky meters with no remotely read figures for the last two months
- Percentage of remote services carried out on the day suppliers requested them
- Percentage of meters activated within the defined time following an order for Mobile Peak.

Additionally, there is ongoing evaluation of the incentives on the following timescales:

- An annual review of investment costs, with financial incentives (or penalties) if costs drift or are reduced
- A biennial review of compliance with the forecasted deployment timetable, with penalties for late deployment
- A final settlement of the cost and time-scale incentives at the theoretical end of large-scale deployment (i.e., 2021) to induce ERDF to make up any delays or cost variances during the large-scale deployment phase; conversely, if ERDF's performance has deteriorated over the deployment period, it will be more heavily penalized.
- An annual review of the system's performance in terms of quality of service delivered from the start of the deployment phase; penalties are payable if the predefined outputs are not achieved.

Utility operating charges affected by the Linky project will be monitored specifically, particularly when the next tariffs are being defined. During each tariff year, the Commission de regulation de l'énergie will ensure the pattern of operating charges presented by ERDF is consistent with the projections both for cost reductions (in reading metering costs, carrying out technical work, and reducing line losses) and for the costs of operating the metering system (related mainly to the information systems and system administration).

4 Conclusions

As the previous examples and text demonstrate, PBR and PIMs have great value for the electric industry in a wide variety of ways and can be applied to many different situations. However, how exactly PBR mechanisms are most effectively enacted will vary greatly depending on the utility ownership model, institutional arrangements, and a variety of other local factors.

In many jurisdictions, conventional generation companies are worried that they are losing market share or that they will be unable to pay capital costs of current assets. So, what form of incentive regulation would be required for generation owners, and which generation owners are necessary to operate a modern grid? Some sort of incentive may be necessary to ensure certain generation is available for services, such as ramping to accommodate higher renewable penetrations. Transmission companies may need incentives to build bulk transmission where necessary, while ensuring their costs will be recouped despite shifts between distributed and central station generation. Distribution companies need incentives to connect all DERs while not losing money from decreased sales volume and revenue. What PBR mechanisms are best for distribution companies? In restructured markets of the 21st century, the 20th century rules of separation and codes of conduct require attention and become more important than ever to align incentives properly and to avoid hidden incentives.

These power sector dynamics and concerns occur as electric utilities are embedded in an increasingly sophisticated technological society. The power sector often represents progress in developing countries. In all cases, electricity enables achievement of important societal goals. Performance-based regulation is regulation in which anyone can know how the utilities are delivering on clearly stated expectations and, in its higher forms, where management is strongly motivated to deliver on public goals as well as internal and fiduciary goals.

Interest in PBRs is getting stronger. France just announced a new smart-grid-related PBR scheme. In the United States, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission and the Michigan Public Service Commission have plans to engage stakeholders to consider PBR. In Minnesota, the e21 Initiative brought many stakeholders together around PBR for the consideration of regulators. Both India and China are trying innovative new ways to use PBRs to drive change in state-owned entities.

A PBR in the form of cost-cap regulation is proven in multiple jurisdictions to provide cost containment incentives to utilities. However, there are also examples of poorly designed PBR mechanisms providing debatable benefits. Building on successes and failures of more than two decades of PBR development, leading jurisdictions are now moving to adopt incentives focused on pursuing goals as disparate as peak reductions, power plant efficiency, DER integration and interconnection to financial solvency, and smart meter deployments.

As jurisdictions take new approaches and gain experience, refined and successful PBR approaches will continue to emerge. For jurisdictions adopting and implementing PBRs, assessing the incentive level that is enough to make a difference in the approach of management—and no more than is necessary to optimize system, consumer, or societal benefits with room for imprecision—can be challenging. Even with no controversy about the guiding and directional incentives, getting the incentive level right takes time through trial and error, and perhaps starts with tracking performance with no incentive to gain experience with reporting and metric tracking initially. Particularly with innovative approaches and new performance criteria and metrics, examining new metrics to assess whether they work and whether they measure the value intended is a gradual and smart approach to getting the goals, incentives, performance criteria, and metrics calibrated to reflect the value a PBR scheme is intended to achieve. PBR approaches can then be evaluated, refined, and improved to further improve on value creation.

With the performance of regulation becoming more multifaceted—and given the growth of technology and other diverse public policy considerations—the avenues to more explicitly assess utility performance and to support innovation are increasing across multiple jurisdictions.

It is important through this process to distill a narrative about how all customers benefit if a utility receives an incentive for performance. This may involve describing how customers benefit or are supported by this system. It may also include elucidating the value to stakeholders of augmenting regulatory approaches to reward utility behavior rather than the traditional cost-of-service model.

Next-generation PBR may be a part of the answer to a larger question: What is the role of the next-generation utility? Although it is possible to focus on just retooling regulation to better reflect performance, a more fundamental experience may be to reconsider the proper roles for a monopoly utility, including traditional roles such as generation and delivery, of course, but also roles associated with “platform services”—as described in the NY REV process—or distribution system operator services.⁸⁴ Just as new technologies confound traditional resource categories and capabilities, the business model utilities have used for more than a century will evolve to reflect these changing realities and challenges.

⁸⁴ Bade, G. 2015 (January 28). “6 Thought Leaders on the Future of Utility Business Models and Regulation.” *Utility Dive*. <http://www.utilitydive.com/news/6-thought-leaders-on-the-future-of-utility-business-models-regulation/357635/>.



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The 21st Century Power Partnership is a multilateral effort of the Clean Energy Ministerial and serves as a platform for public-private collaboration to advance integrated policy, regulatory, financial, and technical solutions for the largescale deployment of renewable energy in combination with deep energy efficiency and smart grid solutions.

